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ABSTRACT
Model theoretic results such as Characterization and Definability give important information
about different logics. It is well known that the proofs of those results for several modal logics
have, somehow, the same ‘taste’. A general proof for most modal logics below first order is still
too ambitious. In this thesis we plan to isolate sufficient conditions for the characterization
and definability theorems to hold in a wide range of logics. Along with these conditions we will
prove that, whichever logic that meets them, satisfies both theorems. Therefore, one could
give an unifying proof for logics with already known results. Moreover, one will be able to
prove characterization and definability results for logics that have not yet been investigated.
In both cases, it is only needed to check that a logic meets the requirements to automatically
derive the desired results.
Keywords: logic, modal, characterization, definability, saturation.
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ABSTRACT EXTENDIDO
Para una amplia variedad de aplicaciones que usan la lo´gica como herramienta, la lo´gica de
primer orden es suficiente para resolver sus problemas de manera teo´rica. Sin embargo, cuando
se considera el comportamiento pra´ctico de la lg´ica de primer orden uno se encuentra con
varias complicaciones. Primero que nada, la lo´gica de primer orden es indecidible. Esto quiere
decir que no existe un algoritmo general para decidir si una fo´rmula arbitraria es satisfacible.
Segundo, en general la mayor´ıa de las aplicaciones que usan esta lo´gica no aprovechan al
ma´ximo su poder. Por lo tanto, incluso cuando se trabaja con fragmentos decidibles de primer
orden, se puede estar pagando un precio excesivo por cualidades que no sera´n utilizadas.
Las lo´gicas modales proposicionales ofrecen una alternativa a los lenguajes tradicionales.
Pueden ser pensadas como un conjunto de herramientas que permiten dise nar lo´gicas es-
pec´ıficamente construidas para una tarea en particular, posibilitando un control fino en su
expresividad. Ma´s au´n, las lo´gicas modales resultaron tener un buen comportamiento com-
putacional que probo´ ser bastante robusto frente a extensiones. Estas caracter´ısticas, entre
otras, ubicaron a las lo´gicas modales como una alternativa atractiva con respecto a los lengua-
jes cla´sicos como por ejemplo la lo´gica de primer orden.
En esta tesis trabajaremos con lo´gicas modales que son a lo sumo tan expresivas como
la lo´gica de primer orden. Informalmente, esto quiere decir que si uno puede expresar una
propiedad con una formula de dicha lo´gica modal entonces existe una manera de expresar la
misma propiedad en primer orden. En otras palabras, uno puede decir que si una formula
modal ϕ denota una propiedad dada entonces existe algu´n tipo de traduccio´n cuyo resultado
es una fo´rmula de primer orden ϕt que denota la misma propiedad.
En ciencias de la computacio´n, una bisimulacio´n es, a grandes rasgos, una relacio´n binaria
entre modelos que asocia aquellos que se comportan de la misma manera. As´ı, dos modelos
son bisimilares cuando no pueden ser distinguidos mutuamente por un observador. La nocio´n
de bisimulacio´n es ampliamente empleada en varias a´reas como la lo´gica modal, la teor´ıa de
concurrencia, la teor´ıa de conjuntos, la verificacio´n formal, etc.
La nocio´n de bisimulacio´n fue descubierta de manera independiente y relativamente si-
multa´nea por van Benthem, en el contexto de teor´ıa de correspondencia modal; Milner y
Park, en teor´ıa de la concurrencia; y Forti y Honsell en teor´ıa de conjuntos sin axioma de
buena fundacio´n. Estos u´ltimos utilizan bisimulaciones para mostrar la equivalencia de obje-
tos con estructura infinita no-inductiva y garantizar as´ı extensionalidad de los modelos de su
teor´ıa [FH83]. Van Benthem [vB76] obtiene la idea de bisimulacio´n como una generalizacio´n
del concepto de p-morfismo entre modelos; con ella caracteriza a la lo´gica modal ba´sica como
el fragmento de primer orden invariante bajo bisimulaciones (lo que se conoce como Teo-
rema de Caracterizacio´n de van Benthem). Milner y Park fueron los que acun˜aron el te´rmino
bisimulacio´n, te´cnica que utilizaron como herramienta para probar la equivalencia de procesos
concurrentes [Mil80, Par81]. En [San09] se da un interesante panorama histo´rico del a´rea.
La bisimulacio´n es una herramienta crucial en el proceso de estudiar estructuras rela-
cionales y abre el camino para poder analizar formalmente caracterizaciones de la expresivi-
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dad de los lenguajes modales. Intuitivamente, fijada una lo´gica L, la nocio´n de bisimulacio´n
define cua´ndo dos modelos son indistinguibles para L (es decir, no existe una fo´rmula de
L que sea verdadera en un modelo y falsa en otro). Existe una gran variedad de a´reas en
donde la bisimulacio´n juega ahora un rol central: lo´gica modal [vB76], teor´ıa de concurren-
cia [Par81], teor´ıa de conjuntos [FH83], verificacio´n formal [COP00], generacio´n de lenguaje
natural [AKS08], etc.
El teorema de caracterizacio´n de van Benthem para la lo´gica modal ba´sica caracteriza
el fragmento de primer orden invariante bajo la definicio´n de bisimulacio´n. Informalmente,
puede ser enunciado de la siguiente manera.
Teorema. Una formula de primer orden α es equivalente a la traduccio´n de una fo´rmula de
la lo´gica modal ba´sica si y solo si α es invariante bajo bisimulaciones.
Ahora bien, desde un punto de vista lo´gico, no existe una u´nica nocio´n de bisimulacio´n.
A cada lenguaje modal le corresponde una nocio´n de bisimulacio´n distinta (o, en el caso de
lo´gicas sub-booleanas, una simulacio´n [KdR97, KdR99]).
En general, cada combinacio´n de lo´gica y bisimulacio´n tiene su demostracio´n de un teorema
equivalente a la caracterizacio´n de van Benthem. Un problema esencial es que no parece haber
una demostracio´n general y cada caso necesita una nueva prueba usando herramientas ad-hoc.
El nacimiento del concepto de bisimulacion y la teor´ıa de correspondencia ayudo´ a respon-
der nuevas preguntas desde una perspectiva puramente de teor´ıa de modelos. Un ejemplo
es la caracterizacio´n de definibilidad en lo´gica modal. Informalmente decimos que una clase
de modelos es definible por un conjunto de formulas Γ si esta´ compuesta por exactamente
todos los modelos donde Γ es va´lida. Una clase se dice definible por una fo´rmula modal si es
definible por un conjunto singleton.
Ser´ıa interesante saber que´ propiedades deber´ıa cumplir una clase de modelos para ser
definible ya ser por un conjunto de fo´rmulas o por u´nica una fo´rmula modal. Esta pregunta
ya se ha enunciado y respondido para la lo´gica de primer orden. Para ese caso, la respuesta
esta´ formulada en te´rminos de isomorfismos potenciales. En cambio, en el caso de las lo´gicas
modales la nocio´n de bisimulacio´n juega un rol esencial. Para dar un ejemplo citamos el
siguiente resultado para la lo´gica modal ba´sica [BdRV01].
Teorema. Una clase de modelos K es definible por una formula modal si y solo si K y K
esta´n cerrados por bisimulaciones y ultraproductos.
Por el momento, no es necesario preocuparse por la definicio´n formal de ‘ultraproductos’.
So´lo es necesario saber que los ultraproductos son una construccio´n de modelos (con or´ıgenes
algebraicos) muy u´tiles. Inicialmente, dicha construccio´n llamo´ la atencio´n a los lo´gicos porque
pod´ıa ser usada para dar una demostracio´n puramente algebraica del Teorema de Compacidad
para primer orden. Para un desarrollo detallado sobre ultraproductos recomendamos la lectura
de [Kei08].
Como con el teorema de caracterizacio´n, resultados de definibilidad similares al aqu´ı pre-
sentado valen para una amplia variedad de lo´gicas modales. De la misma manera, cada lo´gica
tiene su propia demostracio´n especialmente disen˜ada para ese caso en particular.
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Claramente, resultados como los de Caracterizacio´n y Definibilidad nos sirven para enten-
der mejor una lo´gica. Es ma´s, estos resultados tambie´n tienen un gran impacto en aplicaciones
pra´cticas de Ciencias de la Computacio´n.
Consideremos el siguiente problema: Supongamos que estamos interesados en realizar
model checking, esto quiere decir, dado el modelo de un sistema, verificar automa´ticamente si
el modelo cumple una cierta especificacio´n. Supongamos tambie´n que la especificacio´n puede
ser escrita como una fo´rmula de primer orden ϕ.
Siempre podemos usar herramientas de primer orden para verificar si el modelo satisface ϕ
pero eso puede resultar, como ya hemos mencionado, en un alto costo en cuanto a complejidad
computacional. Uno podr´ıa tratar de encontrar lo´gicas ma´s ‘baratas’ que puedan resolver
el problema. Si la misma propiedad pudiera ser expresada en una lo´gica modal entonces
probablemente podr´ıamos mejorar la performance del proceso dra´sticamente.
Discutamos un ejemplo concreto: Supongamos que los puntos del dominio de nuestro
modelo son diferentes estados en la ejecucio´n de un programa. De esta manera, hay una
transicio´n desde un punto a otro si es posible ejecutar una transformacio´n del programa que
lo lleve del estado a al estado b. Pensando en el modelo de esta manera se puede ver que los
estados sin sucesores representan estados donde el programa ha finalizado.
Una propiedad deseable del modelo podr´ıa ser que “en cada estado del programa se debe
poder ‘escapar’ del flujo de ejecucio´n”. Esto quiere decir que todo punto debe poder ver
directamente a un estado sin sucesores. Esta propiedad puede ser verificada probando que la
formula de primer orden
ϕ(x) = ∃y.R(x, y)→ (∃z.R(x, z) ∧ ∀w.¬R(z, w))
sea va´lida en el modelo pero tambie´n puede ser verificada probando que la fo´rmula de la lo´gica
modal ba´sica ψ = 3> → 32⊥ sea va´lida en el modelo. Como estas dos fo´rmulas representan
la misma propiedad (son equivalentes) podemos usar model checkers que acepten fo´rmulas de
la lo´gica modal ba´sica como entrada para poder resolver nuestro problema.
Aparte de ser mucho ma´s ‘amigable’, la simple existencia de la fo´rmula ψ nos dice que
la propiedad en cuestio´n es invariante bajo bisimulaciones. Esta informacio´n nos brinda un
beneficio extra. Supongamos que el modelo es automaticamente generado a partir de una
porcio´n de co´digo. Si, por ejemplo, alimentamos al generador con el co´digo de un sistema
operativo entero, el modelo resultante sera´ muy grande.
No es el objetivo de esta tesis meterse en estos temas pero existen algoritmos eficientes para
minimizar el modelo automa´ticamente. Estos algoritmos preservan la verdad de las fo´rmulas
invariantes por bisimulacio´n [Hop71, Gri73]. Por lo tanto, al tener una fo´rmula modal que
representa nuestra propiedad, uno podr´ıa primero minimizar el modelo y hacer model checking
sobre el modelo resultante que sera´, muy probablemente, mucho ma´s chico que el original.
Por otra parte, supongamos que se quiere verificar si el modelo es ‘irreflexivo’. Esto quiere
decir, que ningun elemento esta´ relacionado consigo mismo. Si interpretamos esta propiedad
en el escenario descripto anteriormente, la propiedad dir´ıa que ningun estado debe poder
quedarse ‘colgado’ en si mismo.
Para este caso, incluso cuando la propiedad puede ser puesta a prueba verificando la
validez de la fo´rmula de primer orden ¬R(x, x), no existe ninguna fo´rmula de la lo´gica modal
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ba´sica que sea equivalente. Esto puede ser demostrado facilmente ya que la ‘irreflexividad’
no es invariante bajo bisimulaciones. Es ma´s, la lo´gica modal ba´sica tiene una propiedad
llamada la ‘propiedad de modelo de a´rbol’ o tree model property. Esto quiere decir que
cualquier fo´rmula satisfacible es tambie´n satisfacible en un modelo que tiene forma de a´rbol.
Como corolario surge que no existe ninguna fo´rmula de la lo´gica modal ba´sica que caracterice
irreflexividad, antisimetr´ıa ni intransitividad.
Es este el fin de la lo´gica modal? Estamos condenados a usar la lo´gica de primer orden
en este caso? Afortunadamente, la respuesta es no. Aunque la lo´gica modal ba´sica no pueda
expresar esas propiedades, existen lo´gicas modales ma´s ricas (que au´n se mantienen por debajo
del poder expresivo de primer orden) que pueden hacerlo. Como ejemplo, pueden usarse
las lo´gicas h´ıbridas [BdRV01] y las menos conocidas Memory Logics [AFFM08] que sera´n
oportunamente introducidas.
En s´ıntesis, resultados de teor´ıa de modelos como los de Caracterizacio´n y Definibilidad
dan informacio´n importante sobre las distintas lo´gicas. Se sabe que las demostraciones de
estos resultados para las diferentes lo´gicas modales tienen, de algu´n modo, el mismo ‘sabor’.
Una prueba general que cubra todas las lo´gicas modales por debajo de primer orden es, por
el momento, un plan demasiado ambicioso.
En esta tesis damos condiciones muy generales pero suficientes para que las propiedades
de Caracterizacio´n y Definibilidad valgan en una amplia gama de lo´gicas modales: cualquier
lo´gica modal que cumpla nuestras condiciones verificara´ las propiedades de Caracterizacio´n y
Definibilidad. El resultado se puede aplicar tanto a lo´gicas para las que se saben ciertas las
propiedades en cuestio´n, como a lo´gicas para las que se desconoc´ıa si estas propiedades val´ıan
o no. En el primer caso, obtenemos demostraciones nuevas de resultados ya conocidos (en
particular, aplicamos nuestro esquema a las lo´gicas h´ıbridas con el operador @ y nominales).
En el segundo caso, obtenemos resultados novedosos, aplicando nuestras herramientas a las
memory logics, una familia de lo´gicas modales con comportamiento dina´mico introducidas
recientemente en el a´rea.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 A bit of history
The first traces of modal logic go back to 1918 with the work of C. Lewis [Lew18]. In this
publication he enriched the propositional calculus with two operators to try to solve some
problems with material implication. In a modern notation these operators would be 2 and
3. Given a formula ϕ, then, 2ϕ was meant to be interpreted as “it is necessary that ϕ” and
3ϕ as “it is possible that ϕ”. At this point (called the ‘syntactic era’) all the work on Modal
Logic was strictly syntactical, there was no model theory for it.
Later, during the end of 1950s and early 1960s (sometimes called the ‘classical era’) the
first ideas on modal logic semantics were born. The seminal work of Prior [Pri57] (with
tense logic) and Jo´nson and Tarski with boolean algebras with operators [JT51, JT52] later
gave birth to Kripke semantics for modal logics. Kripke’s work [Kri63a, Kri63b] proposes a
relational semantic for modal logic, that is, a suitable model to evaluate a modal formula is
just a set of worlds (or points) and relations among them.
With these semantics, many difficult problems (such as knowing whether two axiomatic
systems are equivalent) had now turned a lot easier. The emergence of cannonical models and
completeness results were predominant in this period which helped link the ancient ‘syntactic
era’ with the new semantics. Although the research made in the ‘classical era’ was not
syntactical, it was anyways syntactically driven. That is, relational semantics, were used as a
tool to analyze logics and prove syntactical results. Model theory, was not playing a big role
by itself.
The so-called ‘modern era’ goes from the 1970s to the present days. In this period, modal
logic started to be used to describe relational structures and not just as a mere tool. The germ
of modal logic also started to spread to other fields, as an example, computer scientists started
to use modal logics to reason about programs represented as relational models. The first steps
in this line of work were taken by Pratt [Pra79] with his work on propositional dynamic logic
(PDL). Computer scientists added new problems to the already growing pool of questions.
Complexity of the satisfiability problem for modal logics started to be studied with the work
of Ladner [Lad77] for normal logics and Ladner, Fischer and Pratt [FL79, Pra79] for PDL.
The discovery of frame incompleteness results showed that there are classes of models for
which there is no possible axiomatization (Thomason [Tho72, Tho74] and Fine [Fin74]). This
shows that modal logics can’t be analyzed from a purely syntactical perspective.
Modal logic is not isolated from the rest of the world. During this period, the expressive
power of modal logics was put into question. Which logic is the best to describe certain
relational structures? Now that we know that different logics have different computational
complexities, which is the ‘cheapest’ logic that solves my problem? The power of these logics
could be compared between each other and also with respect to classical logics such as first
and second order logic.
The results brought to light by this period helped shift the view of modal logics as ‘in-
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tensional’ formalisms that were only able to talk about ‘modes of truth’ to a much broader
panorama, which constitutes the current way of looking at modal logics.
1.2 Basic modal logic
It is now time to formally meet the modal logics we are going to work with and its relational
semantics. We start by defining the basic modal language BML. Because we are interested in
working with many modalities at the same time, the diamond (3) and box (2) operators are
going to turn into the operators 〈r〉 and [r], where r indicates the modality we are working
with. When we are in a case where there is a single modality, we are going to use 3 and 2
again.
Definition 1.2.1 (Syntax). Suppose we have a set of propositional symbols prop = {p1, p2, . . . }
and a set of modality symbols rel = {r1, r2, . . . }. We assume that both sets are pairwise
disjoint and countable infinite. A specific choice of prop and rel is called the signature of
the language. We define the set of formulas of the basic modal language over the signature
〈prop,rel〉 as:
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ϕ↔ ψ | 〈r〉ϕ | [r]ϕ
where p ∈ prop, r ∈ rel and ϕ,ψ are formulas.
Of course this is not a minimal definition. One can fix an adequate set of primitive boolean
connectors (like ¬ and ∧) and define all the other boolean connectors in terms of that primi-
tive set. Also, as it will follow from the satisfaction definition we are going to present below,
diamond and box are dual operators, and therefore for all r ∈ rel, 〈r〉ϕ can be defined as
¬[r]¬ϕ, and conversely, [r]ϕ is equivalent to ¬〈r〉¬ϕ. We are not going to bother yet to pick
a set of primitives operators, since it is not really important at this point. When we do that,
we will only have to worry about choosing a convenient set that allows us to generate the
whole language.
Now we formally define the models for the basic modal language. As we mention before,
Kripke semantics define models as graphs, and in fact, as directed graphs with decorations.
Definition 1.2.2 (Kripke models). Let S = 〈prop,rel〉 be a signature. A Kripke model M
for S is a tuple 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 satisfying the following conditions:
(i) W , the domain, is a nonempty set whose elements are called points, but also, depending
on the context, states, worlds, times, etc.
(ii) Each Rr, an accessibility relation, is a binary relation on W .
(iii) V : prop → P (W ), the valuation, is a labeling function that assigns to each proposi-
tional symbol p ∈ prop a subset of W . We can think of V (p) as the set of points in M
where p holds.
Given a model M and w ∈ |M|, we call 〈M, w〉 a pointed model.
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Before moving on, let us see an example of a Kripke model, in order to clarify the concept.
In the following model we will give a graphical representation of the domain and the relations
of the model. A node represents an element in the domain and an edge from w to w′ labeled
as R means that wRw′.
Example 1.2.3. Consider the following model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉:
w1
R2
w2
w3
w4
p
p, q
q
R1
R1
R2
R2
R1
This model has a domain of four points, W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. The signature in which it
is based on is 〈prop = {p, q},rel = {r1, r2}〉, that is, it has two modalities, r1 and r2, and
two propositional symbols, p and q. We explicitly indicate in the picture the places where
the propositional symbols hold. Translated to the valuation function V , that means that
V (p) = {w1, w3} and V (q) = {w2, w3}. Observe that at w4 no propositional symbol holds.
Now we are ready to define the semantics for the basic modal language, since we already
have both the syntax and the structures the language is going to talk about. Recall that
modal logics describe Kripke structures from an internal perspective. This means that, in
contrast with first order logic in which formulas see models from some kind of omniscient
lookout point, modal formulas are evaluated at some particular point of the model.
Definition 1.2.4. Given the modelM = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 and w ∈W , we inductively define
the notion of a formula ϕ being satisfied (or true) in M at the point w as follows:
M, w |= > always
M, w |= ⊥ never
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) p ∈ prop
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ↔ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ if and only if M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 〈r〉ϕ iff there is a w′ such that wRrw′ and M, w′ |= ϕ
M, w |= [r]ϕ iff for all w′ such that wRrw′,M, w′ |= ϕ
Given a model M, we say that ϕ is globally satisfied (or globally true) on M, and write
M |= ϕ, if for all points w in the domain of M we have that M, w |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is
universally valid if it is globally satisfied in all models, and in that case we write |= ϕ. A
formula ϕ is satisfied in a model M when there is a point in M where ϕ is true, and ϕ is
satisfiable if there is some point in some model at which it is satisfied. When working with
sets of formulas, these definitions are lifted in the expected way.
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1.3 Model equivalence
Let M and M′ be two models for a logic L, and w and w′ be two points in M and M′
respectively. We say that w and w′ are L-equivalent (notation: w ≡L w′) if they make the
same L-formulas true.1 This means that, although the models may be different, if we look at
w and w′ “through the glasses of the logic L” they are indistinguishable. Consider now the
following two models.
w
M1
v
M2
Fig. 1.1: The points w and v are BML equivalent.
Let us consider the basic modal language. Assuming that V (p) = ∅ in both models for all
p ∈ prop, is there a way to distinguish w from v in BML? That is, is there a basic modal
formula that is true at w and false at v? It doesn’t seem to be easy to find one. On the other
hand, if we can use first order logic this is quite straightforward: the formula ¬R(x, x) is true
if we assign w to x, and false in the case of v.
Equivalence as a structural notion
One could pick two pointed models 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 and ask wether they are L-equivalent
for a given logic L without checking every possible formula. For example, in Figure 1.1, we
would like to know if there is a structural relationship between the models that makes them
equivalent for BML.
In classical first-order logic this relationship corresponds to potential isomorphisms, which
is defined as follows in [CK90].2
Definition 1.3.1 (Potential isomorphism). Let Mf and N f be first order models with do-
mains M and N respectively. A potential isomorphism between Mf and N f is a relation Z
on the set of pairs of finite sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉, 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of A and B of the
same length such that:
(i) ∅ Z ∅.
(ii) If 〈a1, . . . , an〉 Z 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 then (Mf , a1, . . . , an) and (N f , b1, . . . , bn) satisfy the same
atomic formulas.
(iii) If 〈a1, . . . , an〉 Z 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 then for all c ∈M there exists d ∈ N such that 〈a1, . . . , an, c〉 Z 〈b1, . . . , bn, d〉
and vice versa.
1 When the logic is clear from context we don’t add the subscript L.
2 In the literature, such as [CK90], potential isomorphism are sometimes called ‘partial isomorphism’ because
they are formed of sequences of isomorphism with restricted domain.
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We use Mf ∼= N f to note that there exists a potential isomorphism between Mf and N f .
Observe that potential isomorphism relations are symmetrical, that is,Mf ∼= N f if and only
if N f ∼=Mf .
Given two first-order models Mf ,N f if Mf ∼= N f then the models are indistinguishable
by first-order logic [CK90, Proposition 2.4.4] (they are also called elementary equivalent).
In the modal domain, take the basic modal logic as an example, the notion of bisimulation
between models gives a structural notion which implies that the models are equivalent when
looking through the glasses of basic modal logic [BdRV01, Section 2.2]. For a detailed historical
insight on bisimulation we recommend [San09].
Let’s take a look at the definition of bisimulation for the basic modal logic. We will give
the definition for the monomodal version of BML because its simplicity is suitable for this
introduction but all the definitions and results of this chapter also hold for the multimodal
case.
Definition 1.3.2 (Bisimulation for BML). A bisimulation between two BML modelsM = 〈W,R, V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is a non-empty binary relation Z ⊆ W ×W ′ between their domains
such that whenever wZw′ we have that:
Atomic harmony: w and w′ satisfy the same propositional symbols.
Forth: if wRv, then there exists a point v′ in M′ such that vZv′ and w′R′v′.
Back: if w′R′v′, then there exists a point v in M such that vZv′ and wRv.
If there is a bisimulation between two modelsM andM′ we say thatM andM′ are bisimilar
and we write M↔M′. Moreover, we say that two points w ∈M and w′ ∈M′ are bisimilar
if they are related by some bisimulation, and we write M, w ↔M′, w′. We write w ↔ w′
when the models are clear from context.
Returning to the models M1 and M2 we have just presented in Figure 1.1, it is easy to
see that M1, w ↔M2, v. The bisimulation would be as follows (the dotted line indicates the
pairs in the bisimulation relationship):
w v
Fig. 1.2: Bisimilar models.
The definition of bisimulation we just gave is specifically designed for the basic modal
logic, and thus the expected property is that satisfiability of formulas in the basic modal logic
is invariant under bisimulations as proved in [BdRV01].
Theorem 1.3.3. Let M and M′ be two Kripke models over the same signature. Then, for
every w ∈ M and w′ ∈ M′, if w ↔w′ then for every formula ϕ of BML, M, w |= ϕ if and
only if M′, w′ |= ϕ.
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The aforementioned logics, namely BML and first order logic, have both negation and
disjuction in their languages and both “model equivalence” notions (bisimulation and po-
tential isomorphisms) are symmetrical. In many areas of computer science one finds logical
formalisms that lack some of the standard Boolean connectives ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’. In par-
ticular, negation-free logics are widely used in areas as diverse as semantics of programming
and knowledge representation. In some applications, such as the generation of referring ex-
pressions [AKS08], Boolean negation may be unnatural.
Take now the basic sub-boolean modal logic, BML-, which is defined as BML but doesn’t
have negation nor the 2 modality. As the language is weaker, the notion of model equivalence
should change. Bisimulations, for example, are too strong for negation-free logics because
they preserve negation. In [BdRV01, Definition 2.77] we can find the definition of the concept
of simulation for negation-free logics. If there is a simulation from M, w to N , v then every
formula true at M, w is also true at N , v. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 1.3.4 (Simulation for BML-). A simulation between two modelsM = 〈W,R, V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is a non-empty binary relation Z ⊆ W ×W ′ between their domains
such that whenever wZw′ we have that:
Atomic condition: If w ∈ V (p) then w′ ∈ V (p) for all p ∈ prop.
Forth: if wRv, then there exists a point v′ in M′ such that vZv′ and w′R′v′.
If there is a simulation between two models M and M′ we write M →M′. Moreover, we
say that two points w ∈ M and w′ ∈ M′ are similar if they are related by some simulation,
and we write M, w →M′, w′. We write w →w′ when the models are clear from context.
Observe that, in this case, half of the “Atomic harmony” condition has been removed.
Another point to be taken into account is that even though BML’s bisimulation is symmetrical,
simulations need not to be. This notion is specially suited for BML- and preserves every
formula formed from ∧,∨ and 3. The following theorem states this formally.
Theorem 1.3.5. Let M and M′ be two Kripke models over the same signature. Then, for
every w ∈ M and w′ ∈ M′, if w →w′ then for every formula ϕ of BML-; M, w |= ϕ implies
M′, w′ |= ϕ.
As the notion of simulation is less restrictive than the notion of bisimulation it should
be no surprise to find models which are similar but not bisimilar. Take, for example, the
following two models.
Again, the dashed lines indicate the pairs in the simulation relation. We can see, that
M1, w0 →M2, v0, on the other hand, there is no bisimulation linking them. To show this,
it is enough to exhibit a formula ϕ such that M2, v0 |= ϕ and M1, w0 6|= ϕ. In this case, a
possible formula is 3r.
Equivalence as a game
These notions of model equivalence can also be presented using a more dynamic perspective,
closer to a form of process equivalence. For example, the task of determining whether two
models are bisimilar can be recast in the form of an Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game [EFT84].
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w0 p
p, q
v0
p
p, q
p, r
M1 M2
Fig. 1.3: Similar but not bisimilar.
Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two pointed models. An Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for the
basic modal logic is defined as follows. There are two players called Spoiler and Duplica-
tor. Intuitively, Spoiler tries to devise a property true in one model and false in the other.
Conversely, Duplicator tries to ‘copy’ the property from one model to the other by imitating
Spoiler’s movements.
The two players compare successive pairs, starting from (M1, w1) and (M2, w2). Duplica-
tor immediately loses if w1 and w2 do not coincide in the propositional symbols. Otherwise,
the game starts, with the players moving alternatively. Spoiler always makes the first move
of the game. In a turn of the game, Spoiler starts by choosing in which model he will make
a move. After that, he chooses a point which is a successor of the current w1 or w2, and Du-
plicator responds with a matching successor in the other model. If the chosen points differ in
the atomic propositions, Spoiler wins. If one player cannot move, the other wins. Duplicator
wins on infinite runs.
Note that with this definition, exactly one of Spoiler or Duplicator wins each game. A
strategy for Duplicator is a function that takes a valid state of the game (i.e. a pair 〈a, b〉
with a ∈ |M1| and b ∈ |M2|) and returns a possible next move for Duplicator. A strategy for
Spoiler is defined in the same way but note that the function should also return the model
in which Spoiler should make the move. We say that a player is following a strategy σ when
all his moves in a game comply with the answer of σ for every stage of the game. A strategy
is winning if the player following it necessarily wins the game, no matter what his opponent
plays. Given two pointed models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 we will write 〈M1, w1〉 :b 〈M2, w2〉
when Duplicator has a winning strategy for the game.
Intuitively, this game captures exactly the zigzag behavior of bisimulations, and the atomic
harmony condition. The two notions are equivalent, but depending on the context, one can
be more natural than the other.
Proposition 1.3.6. [GO05] Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two BML pointed models, then
〈M1, w1〉 :b 〈M2, w2〉 if and only if 〈M1, w1〉 ↔〈M2, w2〉.
The perspective of model equivalence as a game is not restricted to the basic modal logic.
With minor modifications to this notion of game we can create a notion that is suitable for
BML-, for instance. An Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for BML- is the same as the game for the
basic modal logic but spoiler can’t choose the model where he is playing. That is, Spoiler
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starts playing in M1 and he won’t be able to change to M2.
Suppose that Spoiler and Duplicator start a game standing in (M1, w1) and (M2, w2)
respectively. If Duplicator has a winning strategy thenM1, w1 →M2, w2. On the other hand,
if Spoiler has a winning strategy thenM1, w1 6→M2, w2. We will write 〈M1, w1〉 :s 〈M2, w2〉
when Duplicator has a winning strategy for the game. The following proposition states the
equivalence between BML- simulation and the game definition.
Proposition 1.3.7. Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two BML- pointed models, then 〈M1, w1〉 :s
〈M2, w2〉 if and only if 〈M1, w1〉 →〈M2, w2〉.
Summing up, simulations and bisimulations are very powerful tools to measure the expres-
sivity of a logic: they provide us with structural conditions on the models that characterizes
the appropriate structure preserving morphisms. Since simulations are directly linked to the
expressivity of a given logic, there is not a unique notion of simulation. Here we have just
presented the notion of bisimulation for BML and simulation for BML-, but for every logic we
need to find a suitable definition, and this notion will reflect the logic’s expressive power. In
this sense, looking for the appropriate notion of model equivalence allows us to learn about
the logic we are working with.
1.4 Saturation
We have discussed a lot about model equivalence notions, in particular about simulations and
bisimulations, but we have been avoiding a fundamental question. Let’s focus on bisimula-
tions, we know that M, w ↔N , v implies M, w ≡ N , v. Does, in general, the converse hold?
That is, does M, w ≡ N , v imply M, w ↔N , v? The answer is no. Consider the following
two models:68 2 Models
. . . . . .
. . . . .
Fig. 2.5. Equivalent but not bisimilar.
transition systems (LTSs) are a standard way of thinking about computation: when
we traverse an LTS we build a sequence of state transitions — or to put it another
way, we compute. When are two LTSs computationally equivalent? More pre-
cisely, if we ignore practical issues (such as how long it takes to actually perform
a computation) when can two different LTSs be treated as freely exchangeable
(‘observationally equivalent’) black boxes? One natural answer is: when they are
bisimilar. Bisimulation turns out to be a very natural notion of equivalence for both
mathematical and computational investigations. For more on the history of bisim-
ulation and the connection with computer science, see the Notes.
Remark 2.22 (Bisimulation and First-Order Logic)According to Theorem 2.20
modal formulas cannot distinguish between bisimilar states or between bisimilar
models, even though these states or models may be quite different. It follows
that modal logic is very different from first-order logic, for arbitrary first-order
formulas are certainly not invariant under bisimulations. For example, the model
of Example 2.17 satisfies the formula
if we assign the state to the free variable . This formula says that there is a
diamond-shaped configuration of points, which is true of the point in , but
not of the state in . But as far as modal logic is concerned, and , being
bisimilar, are indistinguishable. In Section 2.4 we will start examining the links
between modal logic and first-order logic more systematically.
Now for a fundamental question: is the converse of Theorem 2.20 true? That is, if
two models are modally equivalent, must they be bisimilar? The answer is no.
Example 2.23 Consider the basic modal language. We may just as well work with
an empty set of proposition letters here. Define models and as in Figure 2.5,
where arrows denote -transitions. Each of and has, for each , a finite
branch of length ; the difference between the models is that, in addition, has an
infinite branch.
M1 M2
It can be shown that, although w and w′ satisfy the same BML formulas, there is no
possible bisimulation between them. Recall that in Section 1.3 we presented an alternative
interpretation of bisimulations as games. We will now use that notion to prove that these
models are not bisimilar.
Set a game between Duplicator and Spoiler with them starting at (M1, w) and (M2, w′)
respectively. The first turn is for Spoiler. He chooses to stay inM2 and move to the successor
of w′ that lays in the infinite branch of the model. Now it is Duplicator’s turn, he must move
to a matching world inM1. As the atomic harmony condition is trivially satisfied by any two
pairs of these models, the only problem could arise if Spoiler makes a move and Duplicator
has no possible successors to move to. Duplicator has to choose a branch in M1 and move
to it. Suppose, without loss of generality, that Duplicator chooses a branch with k nodes.
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You can easily see that, as there is no going back, if Spoiler carries on moving in his infinite
branch there will be a moment (after k moves) when Duplicator hits the end of his branch in
M1. In that moment Spoiler wins the match.
The strategy we’ve described guarantees that Spoiler will win no matter what Duplicator
chooses. Therefore, as Spoiler has a winning strategy the models are not bisimilar. In fact,
as Spoiler starts the game in M2 and never changes the model this argument proves that
M2, w′ 6→M1, w which is a stronger result.
Do not panic. There are some classes of models where modal equivalence implies bisimi-
larity. A very useful one is the class of ω-saturated models. In order to present this class we
need some previous definitions.
The following notions will be given in terms of first order models and not BML models
but this shouldn’t carry any problem. Later, in Section 4.2, we will see that there is a
straightforward formalization that lets us think of a model as a BML or first order model
interchangeably.
Notation 1.4.1. We will use ϕ(x) to note first order formulas with at most one free variable
x this notation extends to sets Γ(x) as expected. The notation g[x 7→ w] denotes a valuation
g′ that is the same as g on every parameter except on x where g′(x) = w. Given a first order
formula ϕ(x) we will hereafter note Mf |= ϕ(x)[w] to mean Mf , g[x 7→ w] |= ϕ(x). Observe
that, as ϕ has only one free variable x the valuation will be irrelevant. Given a model M we
use |M| to denote the domain (or universe) of M.
Definition 1.4.2. A set of first order formulas with (at most) one free variable is called a
type. Given a model Mf we say that a type Γ(x) has a witness if there exists a state w such
that for every formula ϕ(x) ∈ Γ(x) we have Mf |= ϕ(x)[w]. A type is finitely realizable if
every finite subset has a witness.
Definition 1.4.3 (Expansion). LetMf be a first order model with domain W . For A ⊆W ,
the expansion of F with A (noted F[A]) is obtained by extending F with new constants a for
every element a ∈ A. The model MfA is the same as Mf but interprets the constants as
expected.
We are now ready to define ω-saturation. Informally, it resembles some kind of ‘intra-
model’ compactness. That is, given a type Γ(x) if every finite subset is satisfied in (possibly
different) elements inMf then there is a single element in Mf which satisfies the whole set.
Formally speaking the definition is as follows.
Definition 1.4.4 (ω-saturation). A first order model Mf is called ω-saturated if for every
finite A ⊆ |Mf | the expansionMfA has a witness for every type Γ(x) that is finitely realizable
in MfA.
In the beginning of this section we presented two models. One of them had branches
of increasing length, the other one was an exact copy of the first but with an extra infinite
branch. We have already seen that, in some sense, the first model was ‘lacking’ something
that the second one had. The saturation that ω-saturated models have make them complete
in this sense. The following theorem is a very important result which gives strength to the
class of ω-saturated models.
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Theorem 1.4.5 ([BdRV01]). Let 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 be two ω-saturated models,
If M, w ≡ N , v then M, w ↔ N , v.
Therefore, in the ω-saturated class, bisimulation and BML equivalence coincide. This
proof strongly uses the structural definition of bisimulations and thus we will not get into this
kind of detail until we need it in Chapter 5.
A particularly interesting fragment of the ω-saturated class is the finitely branching frag-
ment, that is, every world has only finitely many successors. Another different (and more
restrictive) example of ω-saturated class is the class of finite models.
To finish this section we want to say some final words about ω-saturated models. The
use of ω-saturated models will be crucial to prove the results in this thesis. Because of their
special properties one could think that these models are rather scarce but, fortunately, they
abound. Moreover, there is a standard way of, given an F-modelMf , construct an ω-saturated
model Mf∗ such that Mf ≡FMf∗ . This theorem is stated as Theorem B.7 and proved in the
Appendix.
1.5 What this thesis is about
For a wide spectrum of applications, which use logic as a tool, first order logic is enough to
theoretically solve their problems. However, complications arise when we consider the behavior
of first order logic in practice. First of all, first order logic is undecidable, that is, there is no
algorithm to decide whether an arbitrary formula is a satisfiable. Second, in general, most
applications do not use the entire expressive power that first order gives. Therefore, even
when working in decidable fragments of first order logic, they may be paying an excessive
payload for things they will not be using.
Modal logics are very good at molding themselves to fit a particular purpose. If you know
what you need it is most likely that you can end up with a modal logic which has exactly
the required expressive power but with better properties than first order logic in terms of
complexity and decidability. For example, BML is decidable and has a PSPACE-complete
satisfiability problem.
Along this thesis we will work with logics that are less (or equally) expressive than first
order logic. Informally, this means that if one can express a property with a modal formula
then there is always some way to express the same property in first order. In other words,
one can say that if a modal formula ϕ denotes some property then there exists some kind of
translation to a first order formula ϕt which denotes the same property.
Johan van Benthem studied the connection between modal and first order logic [vB84].
One of his best known results in this area is the ‘Characterization Theorem’ which identifies
BML as the bisimulation-invariant fragment of first order logic. Informally, one can state the
theorem as follows.
Theorem. A first order formula α is equivalent to the translation of a BML formula if and
only if α is invariant under bisimulations.
Note that in this case the notion of bisimulation is that of BML. As we have said before,
every modal logic should have a potentially different notion of bisimulation. For example, we
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have already seen the notion of simulation for BML-. Using this notion, Kurtonina and de
Rijke proved that BML- is the simulation-invariant fragment of first order logic.
BML is just the tip of the iceberg, there exist plenty of extensions of BML to suit particular
needs. Many modal logics admit a translation to first order logic and a characterization of
this kind has been given for some of them. One essential problem is that there seems to be
no general proof and every case needs a new ad-hoc proof.
The birth of the concept of bisimulation and correspondence theory helped answer new
questions from a purely model-theoretic perspective. One example is the characterization of
modal definability. Informally, we say that a class of models is definable by a set of formulas
Γ if it is composed of exactly all the models where Γ is valid. A class is definable by a single
formula if it is definable by a singleton set.
It would be interesting to know which properties should a class of models satisfy in order
to be defined by a modal formula or by a set of modal formulas. This question had previously
been stated and answered for classical first order logic [CK90]. Whereas the answer for first
order logic is presented in terms of potential isomorphisms, in the case of modal logics, the
notion of bisimulation plays an essential role. To uncover the panorama we cite the following
result for BML which can be found in [BdRV01].
Theorem. A class of models K is definable by means of a single BML formula if and only if
both K and K are closed under bisimulations and ultraproducts.
Do not worry about what ‘ultraproducts’ means right now. They will be introduced
when needed. Just bear in mind that they are useful model construction tools (with algebraic
roots) which first caught the attention of logicians because they could be used to give a purely
algebraic proof of the Compactness Theorem for first order logic. For a detailed survey on
ultraproducts we recommend [Kei08].
As with the characterization theorem, definability results similar to the one presented here
also hold for a vast number of modal logics. Similarly, every logic has a proof that is specially
crafted for that case.
Clearly, characterization and definability results help us to better understand a logic.
Interestingly, these results also have a great impact in practical computer science.
Consider the following problem: Suppose you are into model checking, that is, given a
model of a system, test automatically whether this model meets a given specification. Suppose
that the specification can be written as a first-order formula ϕ.
You could always use first-order tools to check if the model satisfies ϕ but that can result
in a high complexity cost as we have already mentioned. One could try to see if there are
‘cheaper’ logics that can be used to solve the problem. If we can express the same property
in some modal logic we may be able to drastically optimize the process.
Let’s discuss a concrete example. Suppose that the points in our domain model the
different states in the execution of a program and there is a transition from one point to
another if there is a possible transformation that brings state a into b. Thinking of the model
in this way would imply that states without successors (also called endpoints) are states were
the program has halted.
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One possible property to be checked could be “every point should be able to immediately
‘escape’ from the flow of execution”, meaning that, every point should be able to directly see
an endpoint. This property can be verified by checking that the first order formula
ϕ(x) = ∃y.R(x, y)→ (∃z.R(x, z) ∧ ∀w.¬R(z, w))
is valid in the model but it can also be checked by verifying that the BML formula ψ = 3> → 32⊥
is also valid in the model. As we have an equivalent BML formula, we can now use model
checkers that accept BML formulas to solve our problem.
Apart from being more ‘user friendly’, the sole existence of the formula ψ tells us that
the property is invariant under bisimulations and this information bears an extra benefit.
Suppose that the model is automatically generated from a piece of code. If, for example, we
feed the generator with the code of an entire operating system, the resulting model will be
very large.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to get into this topic but there are (efficient) algorithms
to automatically minimize the model which preserve the truth of formulas invariant under
bisimulations [Hop71, Gri73]. Therefore one could first minimize the model and then model
check over the resulting model which will most likely be small with respect to the original
one.
On the other hand, suppose now that we want to check whether the model is ‘irreflexive’,
that is, no element is related with itself. If we interpret this property in the setting described
above, it would mean that no state has the possibility to ‘hang’ in itself.
In this case, although the property can be verified checking the validity of the first order
formula ¬R(x, x) in the model, there is no BML formula which does the job. This can be
shown easily because ‘irreflexivity’ is not invariant under bisimulations. Moreover, BML has
the so-called tree model property which means that every formula satisfiable in a model is also
satisfiable in a model which is a tree. As a corollary we get that there is no BML-formula
characterizing irreflexivity, antisymmetry nor intransitivity.
Is this the end of modal logic? Are we condemned to use first-order logic in this case?
Fortunately, the answer is no. Although BML can’t express those properties, there are richer
logics (which still lay below first order) which can do the job. For example, Hybrid Log-
ics [BdRV01] and the less known Memory Logics [AFFM08] which will be introduced later in
this thesis.
To summarize, model theoretic results such as Characterization and Definability give
important information about different logics. It is well known that the proofs of those results
for several modal logics have, somehow, the same ‘taste’. A general proof for most modal logics
below first order is still too ambitious. In this thesis we plan to isolate sufficient conditions for
the characterization and definability theorems to hold in a wide range of logics. Along with
these conditions we will prove that, whichever logic that meets them, satisfies both theorems.
Therefore, one could give an unifying proof for logics with already known results. Moreover,
one will be able to prove characterization and definability results for logics that have not yet
been investigated. In both cases, it is only needed to check that a logic meets the requirements
to automatically derive the desired results.
2. KNOWN RESULTS FOR BML
If we want to generalize a result we’d better understand how it works in specific cases. This
chapter is devoted to sketching the proof of some theorems for BML. This will be helpful
to identify the main ideas in their proofs and, with them in mind, get ready to undertake a
generalization.
2.1 Characterization
We have talked about van Benthem’s characterization theorem. We know that BML is strictly
less expressive than first order logc, therefore, there are some ‘statements’ that you can make
in first order logic which can’t be made in BML. Informally, the Characterization Theorem
identifies which first order formulas have an equivalent formula in the language of BML. More
formally it is stated as follows.
Theorem (van Benthem). A first order formula α(x) with at most one free variable is equiv-
alent to the translation of a BML formula if and only if α(x) is invariant under bisimulations.
Some work is needed for this wording to be precise. First of all, we are comparing modal
formulas with first order formulas. Also, implicitly, when we talk about two formulas being
‘equivalent’, we are evaluating them in some model. That’s a problem because BML formulas
are evaluated in Kripke models and first order formulas aren’t.
For us to be able to do such comparison between BML and first order logic we need to
define a formula translation and a way to interpret every BML model as a first order model
and vice-versa.
For this chapter we will set the signature for BML to be S = 〈prop,rel〉 with prop =
{p1, p2, . . . } and rel = {R} therefore we will use a single diamond. This restriction to the
unimodal case is only to make this introduction simpler. All these results also hold for the
multimodal case.
Definition 2.1.1 (Standard Translation). The Standard Translation function STx takes a
BML formula and returns a first order formula with at most one free variable x. It is defined
as follows.
STx(pi) = Pi(x) where pi ∈ prop
STx(¬ϕ) = ¬STx(ϕ)
STx(ϕ ∧ ψ) = STx(ϕ) ∧ STx(ψ)
STx(3ϕ) = ∃y(xRy ∧ STy(ϕ)) where y is a fresh variable
We only define the translation for a basic (and adequate) connective set. It extends to the
full set of connectives as expected.
In this definition, we can already see that first order formulas include relations Pi and
R, this may give us a hint to define the first order signature. A first order signature is a
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tuple 〈frel, fconst, ffunc〉 where frel is the set of relation symbols, fconst is the set
of constant symbols and ffunc is the set of function symbols. In our case we define the
first-order signature to be F = 〈{R,P1, P2, . . . }, ∅, ∅〉.
Definition 2.1.2 (First order model). A first order model over the signature F is a tuple
Mf = 〈A, (RI)R∈frel, (f I)f∈ffunc, (cI)c∈fconst〉
where A is the (non empty) domain, each RI is the interpretation of the relation symbol R,
each f I is the interpretation for the function symbol f and each cI is the interpretation for
the constant symbol c.
In general we add a superscript or subscript f to first order models so it is easier to
distinguish them from modal models at first sight. We use e, w, v, . . . to refer to elements of
the domain of some model and g, h, . . . to refer to first order valuations.
The crucial point now is to see that there is a bijection between BML models over the
signature S and first order models over the signature F . Given a BML modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉
we can think of it as a first order model defined as
Mf = 〈W, {R,P1, P2, . . . }, ∅, ∅〉
where Pi = V (pi). With this definition one can easily see that, given a BML model M and
w ∈W ; M, w |= pi if and only if Mf |= Pi(x)[w].
On the other hand, observe that any first order model in this signature should be of the
form Mf = 〈W, {R,P1, P2, . . . }, ∅, ∅〉 and one can therefore build a BML model analogously.
As it is usual in the literature, we will use, for this chapter only, the same model and think
of it as a BML or first order model as convenient. Now we can state the theorem that links
BML with first order.
Theorem 2.1.3 (Truth preservation). Let M be a BML model, w ∈ |M| and ϕ be a BML
formula,
M, w |= ϕ if and only if M |= STx(ϕ)[w].
This theorem states that for every BML formula there is a first order formula which is
true in exactly the same worlds, thus, they are equivalent. Now that we have this theorem
at hand it becomes clearer that we can compare formulas and models between BML and first
order logic.
The Characterization Theorem is stated in terms of ‘bisimulations’ and uses notions we
haven’t yet defined. To begin with, we copy the definition of BML bisimulation given in
Section 1.2.
Definition 2.1.4 (Bisimulation). A bisimulation between two models M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and
M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is a non-empty binary relation Z ⊆ W ×W ′ between their domains such
that whenever wZw′ we have that:
Atomic harmony: w and w′ satisfy the same propositional symbols.
Forth: if wRv, then there exists a point v′ in M′ such that vZv′ and w′R′v′.
Back: if w′R′v′, then there exists a point v in M such that vZv′ and wRv.
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In particular, the theorem talks about first order formulas being bisimulation-invariant.
Van Benthem defines this concept as follows:
Definition 2.1.5 (Bisimulation invariance). A first order formula α(x) is invariant for bim-
ulations if for all BML models M,N and w ∈ |M|, v ∈ |N | such that M, w ↔ N , v the
following holds:
M |= α(x)[w] iff M |= α(x)[v].
Observe that, so far, we only know that BML formulas are invariant for bisimulations and
we don’t have a result regarding first order formulas. The result for BML formulas was stated
in Theorem 1.3.3. On the other hand, when talking about first order formulas, some may be
invariant for bisimulations and some others not. The set of formulas that are invariant for
bisimulations is exactly the one identified by the characterization theorem.
As an example, take the following two BML-bisimilar models. The first model is a single
reflexive point and the second one is isomorphic to 〈N, <〉.1 The dashed lines represent the
pairs in the bisimulation relation.
w M1
. . .w′ M2
Now take the first order formula ϕ(x) = R(x, x). This formula holds at an element of the
domain if and only if it is reflexive. It is clear that M1 |= ϕ(x)[w] and M2 6|= ϕ(x)[w′].
As there is a bisimulation w ↔ w′, this two models serve as a proof that reflexivity is not
invariant under bisimulations.
This also means that there is no possible BML formula equivalent to ϕ(x). Suppose that
there exists a BML formula ψ whose translation is equivalent to ϕ. By Theorem 2.1.3 we have
thatM1, w |= ψ iffM1 |= ϕ(x)[w] andM2, w′ |= ψ iffM2 |= ϕ(x)[w′]. We can conclude that
M1, w |= ψ and M2, w′ 6|= ψ. This contradicts Theorem 4.2 because, as it is a BML formula,
ψ should be invariant under BML bisimulations.
We have proved that as ϕ(x) is not invariant under bisimulations it is not equivalent
to the translation of any BML formula. What we have done for one particular case, the
characterization theorem proves for an arbitrary first order formula. Moreover, it also proves
the converse. Now that we understand what we are trying to prove we are ready to begin
with the proof itself.
1 Therefore BML can’t distinguish between a single reflexive point and the naturals. It is surprising that,
as weak as it is, BML is still useful in practice.
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The proof of the Characterization Theorem
In this section we will skim through the proof of van Benthem’s Characterization Theorem.
It is not the goal of this section to give a detailed proof but to review the main ideas that
support it. For a detailed proof refer to [BdRV01, Section 2.6].
Theorem. A first order formula α(x) with at most one free variable is equivalent to the
translation of a BML formula if and only if α(x) is invariant under bisimulations.
Left to right. This direction is easy, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that α(x) is equiva-
lent to the translation of a BML formula ϕ and it is not invariant under bisimulations. That
is, there exist 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 such thatM, w ↔N , v butM |= α(x)[w] and N 6|= α(x)[v].
Using Theorem 2.1.3 we get that M, w |= ϕ and N , v 6|= ϕ. As we have a bisimulation
linking those points and ϕ is a BML formula this drives us to a contradiction to Theorem 1.3.3.
Absurd.
Right to left. All the magic is in the proof of this direction. Suppose that α(x) is invariant
under bisimulations. Define the ‘modal consecuences of α’ as follows.
MOC(α) = {STx(ϕ) : ϕ is a BML formula and α(x) |= STx(ϕ)}
It is trivial (by definition) that α(x) |= MOC(α). As MOC(α) is formed by the translation
of BML formulas, if we can show that MOC(α) |= α(x) then we are done. We first sketch
the proof for this statement and then carry on.
Suppose that MOC(α) |= α(x), by compactness of first order logic there exists a finite
subset ∆ ⊆MOC(α) such that ∆ |= α(x). We therefore have |= ∧∆ ↔ α(x). As every
formula in ∆ is the translation of a BML formula and STx(ϕ∧ψ) = STx(ϕ)∧STx(ψ) we can
conclude that
∧
∆ is also the translation of some BML formula. Therefore we have proved
that α(x) is equivalent to the translation of a BML formula.
Hence, it all boils down to proving that MOC(α) |= α(x). Assume that an arbitrary
model satisfies M |= MOC(α)[w]; we need to show that M |= α(x)[w]. The proof goes as
follows (we now focus on the ideas and then provide more detailed steps):
1. We first ‘create’ a new model 〈N , v〉 such that M, w ≡ N , v and N , v |= α(x). We
would like to transfer the validity of α(x) in N , v to M, w.
2. Using standard model theoretic tools (that will be explained later) we construct, for
M, w and N , v, ω-saturated extensionsM∗, w∗ and N ∗, v∗ which are elementary equiv-
alent to their originators. That is, they have the same first-order theory and they are
ω-saturated. Observe that this implies M∗, w∗ ≡ N ∗, v∗ and N ∗ |= α(x)[v∗].
3. Using Theorem 1.4.5 seen in Chapter 1, as M∗, w∗ ≡ N ∗, v∗ (and they are saturated)
we have that M∗, w∗ ↔N ∗, v∗.
4. Finally, as N ∗ |= α(x)[v∗] and α(x) is invariant under bisimulations we get that M∗ |=
α(x)[w∗]. As M∗ has the same first order theory that its originator we conclude that
M |= α(x)[w].
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That’s it! Those are the main points to bear in mind. The whole idea is to make a ‘detour’
through the class of first order ω-saturated models where bisimulation and equivalence do
coincide. We can now proceed with the dissection of each point.
For the first point we do the following. Define the set Γ as the translation of the BML
theory of M, w, formally speaking
Γ = {STx(ϕ) : ϕ is a BML formula and M |= STx(ϕ)[w]}.
We claim that Γ ∪ {α(x)} is satisfiable. Suppose not, by first order compactness there is
an unsatisfiable finite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ {α(x)}. Observe that Γ0 = {α(x), γ1, . . . , γn} should
include α(x). If it is unsatisfiable it means that |= α(x)→ ¬∧ γi. Hence, ¬∧ γi ∈MOC(α)
because it is a modal consequence of α(x). Remember that one of our hypothesis was M |=
MOC(α)[w] therefore M |= ¬∧ γi but this is impossible since every formula in Γ was true
at M, w by definition. Absurd.
As Γ∪{α(x)} is satisfiable we can say that there exists a model N and an element v ∈ |N |
such that N |= Γ[v] and N |= α(x)[v].
For the next three points the explanation given above should suffice. For further details
we give the references where the theorems that we used are proved. For the second point we
use Theorem B.7 of the Appendix on M and N and conclude exactly what we need. The
theorems needed for the third point are already mentioned in the enumeration so there is
nothing to add. The last point is the grande finale where the validity of α(x) is transfered
over the bisimulation to end up in M, w.
Observe that this proof works for BML which is a logic that has negation and disjunction.
For negation-free logics the proof needs to be changed a little and for logics lacking disjunction
the proof really changes a lot. In [KdR97] you can find proofs for these languages.
In Chapter 3 we propose a framework to generalize this proof. Although the proof devel-
oped in this chapter looks pretty simple, in every step it makes use of a lot of suppositions
that we may not be aware of. In a general scenario we will be working with an arbitrary
translation, an arbitrary signature, an almost unknown model structure, etc. Because of the
amount of uncertainty that we will have, we will need to do more complex detours to take
the flux of the proof to some better known landscape. Be sure to remember this proof when
reading Chapter 3 and 4. Going back and forth may be useful to understand the motivation
for some definitions.
2.2 Definability
In Section 1.5 we presented a piece of one of the Definability results for BML. In this section
we start by defining the concepts needed to state the full result.
Notation 2.2.1. Let K be a class of models we write K to denote the complement of K with
respect to the class of all models. This notation will be used for both modal and first order
models.
Definition 2.2.2. Let K be a class of pointed BML models.
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(i) K is definable by a set of formulas Γ if and only if for every 〈M, w〉 it holds thatM, w |= Γ
if and only if 〈M, w〉 ∈ K.
(ii) K is definable by a single formula if it is definable by a singleton set.
Theorem 2.2.3. Let K be a class of BML models.
(i) K is definable by means of a set of BML formulas if and only if K is closed under
ultraproducts and bisimulations and K is closed under ultrapowers.
(ii) K is definable by means of a single BML formula if and only if both K and K are closed
under bisimulations and ultraproducts.
As before, we have to define what the closure condition mean for this theorem to make
sense. We start by giving an informal introduction to ultraproducts. For this section it is
enough to think of ultraproducts as follows: Given a family of first order models (Mi, wi)i∈I
we can combine them and get a resulting model which is called the ultraproduct.2 When every
model in the family is the same we call the resulting model an ultrapower.
This new model satisfies some nice properties that will be useful for us. We take one of
them from Appendix B to illustrate the idea.
Theorem. Let Mf , w be the ultraproduct of (Mi, wi)i∈I and let Γ be a set of first order
formulas.
• If every Mi, wi |= Γ then M, w |= Γ.
• In the particular case of an ultrapower this implies that Mi, wi |= ϕ if and only if
M, w |= ϕ.
We are ready to define the closure under ultraproducts and ultrapowers. These definitions
should only be used for the special case of BML. In the next sections we will need to redefine
these notions to have a broader reach.
Definition 2.2.4. A class K of pointed BML models is closed under ultraproducts if and only
if, for every family of BML models (Mi)i∈I with Mi ∈ K the ultraproduct of those models
also belongs to K. The closure under ultrapowers is defined as expected.
With respect to the closure under bisimulations, it is a lot easier to imagine what it means.
We define the notion of closure under bisimulations for the special case of BML bisimulations.
Definition 2.2.5. Let K be a class of BML models, it is closed under bisimulations if and
only if the following holds: For every 〈M, w〉 ∈ K, if 〈N , v〉 is such that M, w ↔N , v then
〈N , v〉 ∈ K.
2 Strictly speaking, there is also another ingredient which is called ‘ultrafilter’. Consult Appendix B for
further information on ultrafilters and ultraproducts. We recommend its lecture.
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The proof of the Definability Theorem
In this section we give a sketch of the proofs for the right to left directions of the theorem. A
detailed version can be found in [BdRV01, Section 2.6].
Right to left of (i). Suppose that K is closed under ultraproducts and bisimulations and K is
closed under ultrapowers. The main ideas to prove this theorem are the following:
1. Propose a set Γ = ‘theory of K’ as a candidate set of formulas defining K. Every model
of K trivially makes Γ true. For Γ to define K we still need to prove the other half, that
is: If M, w |= Γ then 〈M, w〉 ∈ K.
2. Take any M, w |= Γ, we will get to a contradiction by assuming that 〈M, w〉 ∈ K. We
start by showing that there is a model 〈N , v〉 ∈ K such thatM, w ≡ N , v. Here we will
use that K is closed under ultraproducts.
3. As we did in the proof of the characterization theorem, we construct, forM, w and N , v,
ω-saturated extensions M∗, w∗ and N ∗, v∗ which are elementary equivalent to their
originators. That is, they have the same first-order theory and they are ω-saturated.
Observe, again, that this implies M∗, w∗ ≡ N ∗, v∗ and N ∗ |= α(x)[v∗].
One important difference with respect to the proof of the characterization proof is that
here we use that K and K are closed under ultrapowers and conclude that 〈M∗, w∗〉 ∈ K
and 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ K.
4. Using Theorem 1.4.5 seen in Chapter 1, as M∗, w∗ ≡ N ∗, v∗ (and they are saturated)
we have that M∗, w∗ ↔N ∗, v∗.
5. Finally, as M∗, w∗ ↔N ∗, v∗ and K is closed under bisimulations then 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ K.
Absurd, in point 3 we had said that 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ K.
As seen before, one of the central tricks is the detour through ω-saturated models. The details
are as follows: In the first point the set should be defined as
Γ = {ϕ : for every model 〈A, u〉 in K; A, u |= ϕ}.
For the second point, let Σ = {ϕ :M, w |= ϕ} be the theory of 〈M, w〉. If we find a model in
K that models Σ then it will be BML equivalent to 〈M, w〉.
The proof in [BdRV01] hand-crafts an ultraproduct of models to make this step but we will
take a route which keeps us away from the inner works of ultraproducts. Suppose that there
is no such set in K making true all of Σ. By Theorem A.1 there exists a finite subset Σ0 ⊆ Σ
that is not satisfiable in K. Then ¬∧Σ0 would be true in K. In particular, M, w 6|= ∧Σ0.
This is absurd because Σ0 is a subset of w’s theory.
Therefore, there exists a model 〈N , v〉 ∈ K such that N , v |= Σ which implies thatM, w ≡
N , v.
The third and fourth points are justified as in the characterization theorem and the fifth
point is self-explanatory.
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Right to left of (ii). Suppose that both K and K are closed under bisimulations and ultraprod-
ucts. Using the first part of this theorem we know that there exist two sets Γ1,Γ2 respectively
defining K and K. It is clear that their union should be unsatisfiable because no model can
be in K and K at the same time.
Using the compactness theorem, as Γ1 ∪ Γ2 is unsatisfiable there must be a finite subset
Γ0 ⊆ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 which is unsatisfiable. Let Γ0 = {α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βm} where αi ∈ Γ1 and
βj ∈ Γ2. As Γ0 is unsatisfiable we can say that |= α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn → ¬(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm). We show
that it is exactly ϕ = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn that defines K.
Trivially every model in K satisfies ϕ. For the converse, take M, w |= α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn, then
M, w 6|= β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm therefore 〈M, w〉 /∈ K which means that 〈M, w〉 ∈ K.
To close this section we want to draw attention to one of the hypothesis in (ii): the need
for both classes to be closed under bisimulations. Observe that, as the bisimulation relation is
symmetric we could’ve just asked for either K or K to be closed under bisimulations and that
would’ve been enough. One can prove that K is closed under bisimulations if and only if K is.
On the other hand, in the proof of (ii) from right to left, we strongly use that both
classes are closed under bisimulations to get two sets that define each of the classes. What
would happen now if we were talking about simulations? As simulations are not necessarily
symmetrical we can’t be sure that K is closed under simulations if and only if K is. This fault
brings problems if we want to follow this same proof scheme.
In [KdR97, KR97] there are alternative proofs for this result for model equivalence notions
that aren’t symmetrical. None of them are general enough to fit the framework that we will
develop but both have proved of great inspiration for the results given in Section 4.3.
3. THE GENERALIZED FRAMEWORK
In this chapter we set up a proper framework which will aid us to prove generalized results for
modal logics which lay (in terms of expressivity) below first order logic. We start by stating
in which sense our results pursue a generalization. We will focus on the following two axes.
Arbitrary modal logic
We want to obtain characterization and definability results which hold for an arbitrary modal
logic. Due to the broad spectrum of different logics we still have to stop somewhere. When
we say ‘arbitrary’ we mean any modal logic with conjunction and disjunction (interpreted as
usual) which is interpreted over extensions of Kripke models.
These logics may come with different model equivalent notions. We want to be able to
derive results no matter what the simulation or bisimulation relation looks like. We will only
put constraints on the ‘arity’ of the relation, that is, it should link an element from the domain
of one model to an element of the domain of other model. It will later become clear that this
last generalization comes with a great price to pay: we know nothing about the structural
properties involved in this notion.
Relativization to a particular class of models
The results presented in Chapter 2 were stated with respect to the class of all models. That
is, BML is the fragment of first order formulas which are bisimulation invariant in the class
of all first models. Think of the following motivational example.
The ‘Basic Temporal Logic’ is a modal logic which is defined as follows: Its language has
the full boolean connective set and two modalities F and P which are often called ‘future’
and ‘past’. The classical perspective on this logic interprets it over Kripke models defined as
a tuple 〈W,R, V 〉 and its satisfaction definition is the following.
M, w |= Fϕ iff there is a v such that wRv and M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= Pϕ iff there is a v such that vRw and M, v |= ϕ
In the definition it is clear that the F modality looks forward in the relation R and the P
modality looks back on it, hence the names ‘future’ and ‘past’. Observe that the F modality
can be thought as a normal ‘diamond’ over the relation R but that is not possible with the
P modality.
An alternative interpretation is as follows. Interpret the logic over Kripke models which
are tuples 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 where R1 = R−12 . With this restriction we can give a different
satisfaction definition for the modalities.
M, w |= Fϕ iff there is a v such that wR1v and M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= Pϕ iff there is a v such that wR2v and M, v |= ϕ
In this case, both modalities are simple ‘diamonds’ (which have been given fancy names F and
P ). Does a similar characterization theorem hold in this case? Which properties should the
21
22 3. The generalized framework
restricted model class have for the characterization to hold? These are the kind of questions
that we will be adressing in the following chapters.
When talking about definability we can think of relative definability as follows: Is the class
K definable with a BML formula given that we only consider models within class K’? That
is, is there a formula ϕ such that for every model in K’,M, w |= ϕ if and only if 〈M, w〉 ∈ K?
The results stated in Chapter 2 are valid for the special case where K’ is the class of
all models. In practice, depending on the domain of application, it is common to work with
restricted classes of models such as finite models, tree models, acyclic models, etc. We want to
know whether these restrictions give us extra information and turn classes that were previously
undefinable into definable classes. A relativized version of the definability theorem should aid
us in this quest.
3.1 Basic definitions
Definition 3.1.1 (Languages and formulas). We note L and F as the source and target
languages respectively. The source language is an extension of the language
P = 〈(pi)i∈N,∧,∨,>,⊥〉
which has infinitely many propositional variables, conjunction and the true and false con-
stants. The target language is a (countable) first-order language which may or may not
contain equality.
FORM(A) is the set of formulas of the language A and FORM(F1) is the subset of
FORM(F) with at most one free variable (and that variable is x).
During this thesis we will deal with source logics which are at most as expressive as
first order logic. If L is less or equally expressive than F we should be able to express in F
everything that is expressible in L. We have seen before that, for BML, there exists a standard
translation STx from BML to first order logic. In general we define a formula translation as
follows.
Definition 3.1.2 (Formula translation). A formula translation is a function
Tfx : FORM(L)→ FORM(F1)
that translates formulas from the source language L to the first-order language F. This
function is required to preserve conjunctions and disjunctions, that is, formally speaking: Let
ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ FORM(L) and  ∈ {∧,∨} then for every first-order formula of the form Tfx(ϕ1) 
Tfx(ϕ2) there exists an L-formula ψ such that Tfx(ψ) ≡F Tfx(ϕ1) Tfx(ϕ2).
As we saw before in the definition of BML’s standard translation, in general, formula
translations are defined homomorphically with respect to the boolean connectives.
Tfx(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Tfx(ϕ1) ∧ Tfx(ϕ2)
Tfx(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = Tfx(ϕ1) ∨ Tfx(ϕ2)
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Definition 3.1.3 (Models). We will be working with source logics that are interpreted over
variations of Kripke models.1 We define MODS(L) to be the class of all models of the source
logic and MODS(F) to be the class of all models of the target first-order logic.
Sometimes we will use the notion of pointed models. A pointed model in the source logic L
is a model-world pair. We can see a pointed model as an L-model where the evaluation point
has been fixed. We define the class of pointed models for the source logic as
PMODS(L) = {〈M, w〉 :M∈ MODS(L) and w ∈ |M|}
Similarly, in the target logic F, we use Mf , g |= ϕ to note that a formula ϕ is true in the
model Mf under the valuation (or assignment) g.2 A pointed model of the target logic F is
a model-assignment pair. We can see a pointed model as an F-model where the assignment
function has been fixed.
Definition 3.1.4 (x-assignment). Let Mf be an F model. An x-assignment for Mf is a
function
g : {x} → |Mf |
which assigns an element for the variable x. It can be seen as a finite valuation specialized to
the variable x.
We will use the concept of x-assignment to define the class of first order pointed models.
This notion is a technical detail needed to make things work in Definition 3.1.6. The problem
and solution will become clear after that definition. We define the class of pointed models for
the target logic as
PMODS(F) = {〈Mf , g〉 :Mf ∈ MODS(F) and g is an x-assignment for Mf}
Observe that the formulas obtained through the translation defined in Definition 3.1.2
have at most one free variable and that variable is x. Therefore, if we want to evaluate those
formulas in a first order modelMf , an x-assignment g is enough forMf , g |= ϕ(x) to be well
defined.
Notation 3.1.5. Let 〈Mf , g〉, 〈N f , h〉 ∈ PMODS(F). We write Mf , g ≡F N f , h to mean
that for every first order formula α(x); Mf , g |= α(x) if and only if N f , h |= α(x).
There’s one more thing to be taken into account, formulas from L and formulas from F are
not evaluated in the same models. The former are evaluated in Kripke models and the later
are evaluated in first-order models. This is the reason why we are not yet able to compare ϕ
with Tfx(ϕ).
We can think of models as ‘information bearers’, they represent some information relative
to the world in a way that is compatible with some logic. Therefore, the information is not in
the model itself but somewhere else. We need to define some way to ‘look at’ this information
from different perspectives, one compatible with the source logic L and other compatible with
the target logic F. Following the same line we define a model translation that ‘converts’ the
information between the source and target logic.
1 Even propositional logic can be thought of as a modal logic without modal operators and restricted to
models with one single point.
2 Observe that in this case g is a valuation and not a point of the domain.
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Definition 3.1.6 (Model translation). Given a class of models K ⊆ PMODS(F), a model
translation is a biyective function
TK : PMODS(L)→ K
We write T instead of TK when the class of models is clear from the context. As an abuse of
notation we use T(M) when we are not interested in the associated assignment and T-1(Af , g)
for the preimage of 〈Af , g〉.
Returning to the need for x-assignments, note that if we allowed g to be a standard
assignment (i.e. g : fvar→ |Mf |) in Definition 3.1.3 then for every pointed L-model 〈M, w〉
we would have many pointed F-model 〈Mf , gi〉 where gi(x) = w and the assignment for the
rest of the variables changes arbitrarily. Therefore, this could carry problems at the moment
of satisfying the suryectivity requirement.
As an exercise, suppose that the class of pointed models is defined with standard as-
signments and try to define a model translation for BML. You will observe that there is a
cardinality problem.
When we proved the results for BML we did not use a model translation, at least not
explicitly. On the other hand, this translation was implicitly present when we gave an in-
formal way to ‘look at’ models from both a BML and a first order perspective. The model
translation function will serve us in this task. We are now ready to set proper constraints on
the translations.
Definition 3.1.7 (Truth preserving pair of translations). A pair of translations (Tfx,T) is
said to be truth-preserving if for all ϕ ∈ FORM(L) and all 〈M, w〉 ∈ PMODS(L)
M, w |= ϕ iff T(M, w) |= Tfx(ϕ)
Let’s fix (Tfx,TK) as our pair of truth-preserving translations for the rest of the thesis. We
will also want to translate formulas from L to F and then go back to L-formulas. As we are
not requiring Tfx to be injective this could lead to a problem. We make the following claim.
Proposition 3.1.8. For any α, β such that Tfx(α) = Tfx(β) we have |=L α↔ β.
Proof. Suppose that 6|=L α↔ β, then we have a modelM and a point w such thatM, w |= α
andM, w 6|= β. Then by definition of truth-preservation of the translations we get T(M, w) |= Tfx(α)
and T(M, w) 6|= Tfx(β). Absurd.
We will use this proposition to make a simplification. First define the equivalence relation
ϕ ∼ ψ iff |=L ϕ ↔ ψ. Regarding L-formulas, we can always take the equivalence classes
defined by the quotient set of L-formulas by ∼ and for each class choose a representative to
work with.
To simplify the proofs in this thesis, and without loss of generality, we will assume that
we are working with the set of formulas defined above. All of our proofs should also work
with the original set of formulas but they would require excessive detours and justifications.
In this setting we will be working up to formula equivalence and we will assume that our
formula translation Tfx is injective.
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Definition 3.1.9. Let K ⊆ MODS(L),M be an L-model and w ∈ |M|. We define the theory
of a pointed model, model and class of models as follows
Th(M, w) = {ϕ :M, w |= ϕ}
Th(M) = {ϕ :M |= ϕ}
Th(K) = {ϕ : ∀M ∈ K it holds that M |= ϕ}
Given two L-pointed models 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 we say that the pointed models are modally
equivalent (noted M, w ≡L N , v) when Th(M, w) = Th(N , v). We say that two models
(not pointed) are modally equivalent (noted M ≡L N ) when Th(M) = Th(N ). We write
M, w vL N , v when Th(M, w) ⊆ Th(N , v) and M vL N when Th(M) ⊆ Th(N ). All these
definitions can be similarly defined for the target logic F and we will assume them defined.
The framework defined in this section will allow us to transfer results between the source
and target logics. As an example we prove compactness for L under some special closure
conditions (which will be addressed later).
Lemma 3.1.10 (L is compact). If L has a pair of truth-preserving translations (Tfx,TK) and
K is closed under ultraproducts then L is compact.
Proof. Let Γ be a set of L-formulas and suppose that any finite set of Γ is L-satisfiable. We
will show that Γ is L-satisfiable.
Take any finite ∆f ⊆ Tfx(Γ), we want to see that it is satisfiable in K. As our formula
translation is injective we have a set ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆ = Tf−1x (∆f ). Observe that ∆ is finite
because Tfx is injective. By hypothesis there exists 〈M, w〉 such that M, w |= ∆ because ∆
is a finite subset of Γ. Hence, by truth-preservation, T(M, w) |= ∆f and T(M, w) ∈ K.
By Theorem A.1 we conclude that there exists a model 〈N f , g〉 in the class K such that
N f , g |= Tfx(Γ). As the translations are truth preserving we get T-1(N f , g) |= Γ.
3.2 General model equivalence
In Chapter 1 of this thesis we introduced the general idea of model equivalence and, in
particular the notions of simulation and bisimulation for some specific logics (namely BML-
and BML). We want the framework we are developing to be able to handle several types of
model equivalence relations.
Restricting ourselves to the definition of simulation and bisimulation we can see that, the
latter can be seen as a special case of the first where there is a symmetrical atomic condition
and a ‘back’ clause. Looking at their common properties we can say that they both agree in
the following points:
(i) They relate a point in one model with a point in the other model. Thus, given M and
N , if Z is such relation then Z ⊆ |M| × |N |.
(ii) They imply some kind of modal theory transfer. In the case of simulations, if wZv then
M, w v N , v. On the other hand, bisimulations imply full modal equivalence: if wZv
then M, w ≡ N , v.
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(iii) For every (bi)simulation betweenM and N , the models’ structure doesn’t change. That
is why the notion of (bi)simulation always links points fromM to points of N . We will
have to make a small change here to be able to handle (bi)simulations in dynamic logics.3
Following this analysis, given a source logic L, we will give a meta-definition for model
equivalence notions. That is, we will not define a relation but give the conditions that a valid
model equivalence notion should satisfy. Any simulation or bisimulation relation satisfying
the next definition fits into our framework.
As an abuse of language, we call it L-simulation. We use this name because it reminds
us of the properties that simulation relation defined for BML- satisfies but it is not the same.
As it will be clear from the definition, we don’t impose any structural constraint.
Definition 3.2.1 (L-simulation). Given two L models M and N we define an L-simulation
to be a non-empty relation Z ⊆ PMODS(L)× PMODS(L) with the following constraint
If 〈M, w〉Z〈N , v〉 then M, w vL N , v
We write M, w →L N , v to indicate that there exists a simulation between w and v and
M →L N to indicate that there exists a point w ∈ |M| such that M, w →L N , v for some
v ∈ |N |. We write w →L v when the models are clear from context.
Note that the simulation definition for BML- satisfies the above definition with minor
changes. The only difference is that we have to take into account the ‘model’ component of
the simulation relation. It can be re-defined as follows.
Example 3.2.2. A BML- simulation is a non-empty binary relation between pointed models
such that whenever 〈M, w〉Z〈N , v〉 we have that:
Atomic condition: If w ∈ VM(p) then v ∈ V N (p) for all p ∈ prop.
Forth: if wR1w
′, then there exists a point v′ in N such that vR2v′ and 〈M, w′〉Z〈N , v′〉.
When thinking about BML’s bisimulation, it may seem that this definition is missing some-
thing. We know that if M, w and N , v are related by a bisimulation then M, w ≡ N , v
but the above definition only guarantees M, w v N , v. Don’t worry about that now, it will
become clear in the next section that this condition is enough for what we need. Observe,
also, that a bisimulation is a special case of Definition 3.2.1 where the relation is symmetric.
We want to stress that this definition of L-simulation does not cover all possible types of
model equivalences and it isn’t suitable for all types of modal languages. One example where
this notion is not adequate is when the language doesn’t have disjuction nor negation. LetM
and N be two models, the right notion of simulation for this language links sets of points from
M to a point of N . As we have defined our possible languages in Section 3.1 this will not be
a problem because we always have disjunction in our source language. For more information
about model theory on disjunction-free languages refer to [KdR97].
3 Logics where the modal operators may change the model.
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3.3 Saturation
We have seen that, in general, modal equivalence does not imply bisimilarity. It is also the
case with BML-’s simulation that, in generalM, w →N , v does not implyM, w v N , v. This
problem recurs with most model equivalence notions found in the literature.
We have stated that in the class of ω-saturated models, BML equivalence implies bisimu-
lation. For this framework we need to define a similar notion which fits the logics we will be
working with. Let’s formally define the general condition that we’re pursuing so we can focus
on it.
Definition 3.3.1 (Hennessy-Milner Property). Let K be a class of L-pointed models, we say
that K has the Hennessy-Milner property if for every two L-models 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 in K,
whenever M, w vL N , v we have M, w →L N , v.
This definition should be interpreted as the converse of the L-simulation (Definition 3.2.1)
requirement and will be the definition of Hennessy-Milner class used in our framework.
Is this definition general enough to cover the cases we have been talking about? We know
that if we fix L as BML and the simulation relation as BML’s bisimulation we have that
M, w ≡L N , v implies M, w ↔L N , v but the definition above seems to impose a stronger
constraint. We only have M, w vL N , v as hypothesis and we should conclude the same
thesis. We make the following statement that explains why there is no problem with this.
Proposition 3.3.2. If L has negation then M, w vL N , v if and only if M, w ≡L N , v.
As BML has negation, the seemingly weak hypothesis turns strong enough to prove the
result in that particular case. The special case regarding saturation for BML is nicely covered
in [BdRV01].
Regarding ω-saturation, the definition given in Definition 1.4.4 is in terms of first order
models. In that moment, as we were looking at BML and first order models as if they were
the same, that gave us no problems.
In this chapter we want to make an explicit differentiation between L-models and F-models.
To make our proofs simpler we choose the following definition for ω-saturated L-models.
Definition 3.3.3. We say that an L-model M is ω-saturated if and only if T(M) is.
For details on ω-saturation, classical results can be found in [CK90]. Also, in Marco
Hollenberg’s thesis [Hol98], he extensively investigates Hennessy-Milner classes.

4. MAIN RESULTS
4.1 Adequate pair
In Chapter 3, while developing the framework, we explained the objectives we are pursuing
when doing a generalization. In the following definition we will make explicit the requirements
for the theorems in this chapter to hold for an arbitrary logic L and with respect to a class
of models K.
Definition 4.1.1 (Adequate pair). A logic L and a class of models K ⊆ PMODS(F) is said
to be an adequate pair if they fulfill the following requirements
1. K is closed under ultraproducts (Definition 4.1.2).
2. There exist truth-preserving translations Tfx, TK (Definition 3.1.7).
3. There exists an L-simulation notion (Definition 3.2.1).
4. The class of ω-saturated L-models should have the Hennessy-Milner property with re-
spect to L-simulations (Definitions 1.4.4 and 3.3.1).
We need to formally define the closure under ultraproducts and ultrapowers used above,
as the ones given in Chapter 2 were specifically crafted for BML.
Definition 4.1.2 (Closure under ultraproducts). A class K ⊆ MODS(F) is said to be closed
under ultraproducts if, let Mfi be a family of F-models in K and let U be an ultrafilter, the
ultraproduct
∏
UMfi is also in K. A more sophisticated definition is needeed for first-order
pointed models.
A class K ⊆ PMODS(F) is said to be closed under ultraproducts if, let 〈Mfi , gi〉 be a family
of F-pointed models and let U be an ultrafilter. Let the
∏
UMfi be the ultraproduct of the
models then 〈∏UMfi , g∗i 〉 ∈ K for every g∗i defined as g∗i (x) = λz.gi(x) for all x.1
Definition 4.1.3 (Closure under ultrapowers). A class K of F-models is said to be closed
under ultrapowers if it is closed under ultraproducts where every Mfi is the same model. A
similar definition can be given for pointed models.
Why are we requiring K to be closed under ultraproducts? We could have asked for more,
such as K being definable by a first order formula, which implies closure under ultraproducts.
We could’ve also tried to impose no restriction over K.
We decided to require K to be closed under ultraproducts because it is the weakest con-
dition that lets us use the relativized version of the first order compactness theorem (stated
and proved in the appendix as Theorem A.1). In particular, all first-order definable classes
and the class of ‘all models’ will always fit in an adequate pair.
1 For a formal definition of the lambda notation refer to [Bar85].
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The second item in Definition 4.1.1 makes sure that L is less or equally expressive than
first order and that there is some way to compare between the formulas and models of both
logics.
In the same way, the third item only asks for the definition of a simulation notion which
is essential to develop the model theory of L. All the results will be stated in terms of that
L-simulation notion.
With enough practice, points one to three can be easily checked by just ‘looking at’ L. It
is only when we get to the last item that we face the strongest requirement. This points says
that the class of ω-saturated L-models should have the Hennessy-Milner property.
In Chapter 2 we mentioned that the class of ω-saturated BML models had the Hennessy-
Milner property with respect to BML bisimulations (although in that moment we didn’t call
it ‘Hennessy-Milner’ yet). The proof of that result makes a link between the semantics of
BML and the structure of the BML bisimulation. Therefore, it makes use of the structural
definition of the BML bisimulation.
So far, given a logic L, we are looking at L-simulations as black boxes. All we know is
that w →L v implies w vL v. We don’t know which structural properties it imposes. This is
the reason why we still need this item to be proved for the results to work.
We think that there’s still much work to be done to weaken this last requirement and we
will give our opinion on directions for further work in the conclusions.
4.2 Characterization
One of the central notions in the characterization theorem for BML was that of bisimulation
invariance. Recall that bisimulations are defined between BML models but the notion of
bisimulation invariance is defined for first order formulas.
Definition. A first order formula α(x) is invariant for BML bimulations if for all BML
models M,N and w ∈ |M|, v ∈ |N | such that M, w ↔N , v the following holds:
M |= α(x)[w] iff N |= α(x)[v].
When working with BML, this difference made no problem to us because we didn’t really
distinguish between BML and first order models. It is time for us to give an invariance
definition that fits our framework and there is an important decision to be made.
The property of ‘invariance’ is thought for first order formulas and the notion of L-
simulation is defined between L models. We have to options: The first one is to call a
first order formula α(x) ‘invariant for L-simulations’ if, for every two L models M, w and
N , v such that M, w →L N , v whenever α(x) holds in T(M, w) it should hold in T(N , v). In
this case we are ‘mixing’ the models through the translation.
The other option is to ‘lift’ the L-simulation notion to F models and define a simulation
relation →F. In this case we could just say that a first order formula α(x) is ‘invariant for L-
simulations’ if, for every two F modelsMf , g and N f , h such thatMf , g →F N f , h whenever
α(x) holds in Mf , g it should hold in N f , h.
The advantage of the first option is that there’s no need for new definitions; in contrast,
the second one would require a formalization for the ‘lifting’ to be defined along with the
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model translation. On the other hand, it would be nice to be able to check two F models for
‘model equivalence’ as we can do with L.
In this thesis we choose the first option because it is the most direct one in this setting.
Observe that, in particular, the first option can be seen as a special case of the second one
when the following ‘canonical lifting’ is defined.
Mf , g →F N f , h iff T-1(Mf , g) →L T-1(N f , h)
Again, the problem with this definition is that it bears no structural information regarding
model equivalence between first order models. It is just another detour.
Definition 4.2.1 (L-simulation K-invariance). Let 〈L,K〉 be an adequate pair. A formula
α(x) of F1 is K-invariant for L-simulations if for all L-models M,N and w ∈ |M|, v ∈ |N |:
If M, w →L N , v and T(M, w) |= α(x) then T(N , v) |= α(x).
Before stating the characterization theorem let’s see the importance and role of the class of
models K in these definitions. What happens to formula equivalence when we change the class
of models? As a motivating example we will work with a first-order formula ϕ = ∀x.R(x, x)
which holds in a model if and only if R is a reflexive relation.
In the class of all models it is obvious that 6|= ϕ (ϕ is not valid) because we can come up
with some models where R is not reflexive. Given that “reflexivity” is not expressible in basic
modal logic, we can conclude that ϕ is not equivalent to the translation of any basic modal
formula.
Definition 4.2.2 (K-equivalence). Let K ⊆ MODS(F) and ϕ,ψ ∈ FORM(F). We say that ϕ
and ψ are K-equivalent if and only if |=K ϕ↔ ψ.
Let’s now restrict the class of models, let K be the class of reflexive models. Now |=K ϕ
because it is valid in every model of the class. In this setting there is a basic modal formula
whose translation is K-equivalent to ϕ. Take ψ = > we have |=K STx(ψ) ↔ ϕ because
|=K > ↔ ϕ. What happened here is that, restricting our class of models the number of valid
formulas has grown and with them the number of “formulas equivalent to a translation”.
Something similar occurs with L-simulation invariance. Again, we have seen that in the
class of all models we can have two bisimilar models where one has a reflexive relation and
the other doesn’t. Therefore “reflexivity” is not invariant under bisimulations.
If we change the class of models to the class of reflexive models we see that now the
property becomes invariant over bisimulations. This happens because it is trivially invariant
all over K. It is nice to observe that the concepts of invariance and equivalence are very
closely related to each other when we change the class of models we are working with.
Theorem 4.2.3 (Characterization). Given an adequate pair 〈L,K〉 then
A formula α(x) of F1
is K-equivalent to the translation of an L-formula iff
α(x) is K-invariant for L-simulations.
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Left to right. Suppose α(x) is K-equivalent to the translation of an L-formula ϕ. We want
to see that it is invariant over L-simulations. This is a consequence of the invariance of
L-formulas over L-simulations. Suppose we have M, w → N , v and T(M, w) |= α(x) but
T(N , v) 6|= α(x). As |=K α(x) ↔ Tfx(ϕ) and the translations are truth-preserving it must
hold that M, w |= ϕ and N , v 6|= ϕ. But this is a contradiction because L-formulas are
invariant under L-simulations and we have a simulation linking those points.
Right to left. Suppose α(x) is K-invariant for L-simulations, we want to see that it is K-
equivalent to the translation of an L-formula. Consider the following set of consecuences
SLC(α) = {Tfx(ϕ) : ϕ is an L-formula and α(x) |=K Tfx(ϕ)}.
We will prove that if SLC(α) |=K α(x) we are done.
Proposition 4.2.4. If SLC(α) |=K α(x) then α(x) is K-equivalent to the translation of an
L-formula.
Proof. Suppose SLC(α) |=K α(x), by relative compactness (Theorem A.1) there is a finite set
∆ ⊆ SLC(α) such that ∆ |=K α(x), therefore |=K
∧
∆ → α(x). Trivially (by definition) we
have that |=K α(x) →
∧
∆ so we can conclude |=K α(x) ↔
∧
∆. As every β ∈ ∆ is the
translation of an L-formula and the translation preserves conjunction then
∧
∆ is also the
translation of some modal formula.
Lemma 4.2.5. SLC(α) |=K α(x).
Proof. Suppose that T(M, w) |= SLC(α). We have to show that T(M, w) |= α(x). Define
NThw(x) as
NThw(x) = {¬Tfx(ϕ) : ϕ is an L-formula and M, w 6|= ϕ}
Observe that, if L has negation then NThw(x) will be the translation of w’s modal theory and
every model of NThw(x) will be modally equivalent to w. If L doesn’t have negation we will
only preserve formulas that are not true in w. This definition fits for both cases. Now define
the set
Σ(x) = {α(x)} ∪ NThw(x).
We will see that Σ(x) has a model in K.
Proposition 4.2.6. Σ(x) has model in K.
Proof. Let’s suppose that there is no model in K for Σ(x) and use the contrapositive of
Theorem A.1. We can conclude that there must be a finite subset {α(x),¬δ1, . . . ,¬δn} ⊆ Σ(x)
with ¬δi ∈ NThw(x) which doesn’t have model in K. Note that this set should include α(x),
otherwise it would have a had model, namely T(M, w).
Observe that, for every model Af ∈ K, as Af 6|= {α(x),¬δ1, . . . ,¬δn} then Af |= α(x)→
¬(¬δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬δn). This means that α(x) → (δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn) is valid in K, therefore α(x) |=K
δ1∨· · ·∨δn. If δ1∨· · ·∨δn is a K-consecuence of α(x) then, as the formula translation preserves
disjunction, δ1∨· · ·∨ δn ∈ SLC(α). But, as T(M, w) |= SLC(α) then T(M, w) |= δ1∨· · ·∨ δn.
This is absurd because T(M, w) 6|= δi for every i.
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As Σ(x) is satisfiable in K we have a model N and an element v such that T(N , v) |= Σ(x).
We make the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.7. N , v vLM, w.
Proof. Take the contrapositive. Suppose that M, w 6|= ϕ then ¬Tfx(ϕ) ∈ NThw(x) and
because NThw(x) ⊆ Σ(x) we can state that T(N , v) |= ¬Tfx(ϕ) which implies that T(N , v) 6|=
Tfx(ϕ). By truth-preservation of the translations we get N , v 6|= ϕ.
We will need to link T(M, w) and T(N , v) in a way that lets us transfer the validity of
α(x) from the second model to the first one. The next lemma will come handy.
Lemma 4.2.8 (Big Detour Lemma). Let α(x) ∈ FORM(F1) be L-bisimulation K-invariant,
if N , v vLM, w and T(N , v) |= α(x) then T(M, w) |= α(x).
Proof. We define some names to avoid cumbersome notation in this proof. We add a subscript
f to the first-order translations of L models, we add a superscript + to first-order saturated
models and a superscript ∗ to modal saturated models.
Applying Theorem A.3 to M, w and N , v (with M1 = M2 = MODS(L)) we build up new
models. The theorem explicitly states the relationship among them, we will use this result to
prove this lemma. Hereafter we will use the same notation as in Theorem A.3.
The following diagram helps to illustrate the actual situation along with the relationship
between the various models. Think of it as a cube. The front face represents the models from
the source language and the back face has the models from the first-order language.
Nf , gv N+f , g+v
N , v N ∗, v∗
Mf , gw M+f , g+w
M, w M∗, w∗
≡L
vL
≡L
→/v
T T
T T
≡F
≡F
Fig. 4.1: Directions for the detour.
With this new notation the Big Detour Lemma can be restated as follows: Let α(x) be
an L-bisimulation K-invariant F-formula, if N , v vLM, w and Nf , gv |= α(x) thenMf , gw |=
α(x).
Using a simple diagram chase argument we can see that, as Nf , gv |= α(x) and N+f , g+v
is elementary equivalent to Nf , gv, then N+f , g+v |= α(x). Because α(x) is invariant under
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L-simulations and N ∗, v∗ →L M∗, w∗ we know that M+f , g+w |= α(x). Again by elementary
equivalence we conclude that Mf , gw |= α(x) which is what we wanted to prove.
Applying this lemma to M, w and N , v and having transfered the validity of α(x) from
T(N , v) to T(M, w) we can conclude that SLC(α) |= α(x). With this final affirmation we
have just proved the right-to-left direction of the characterization result.
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4.3 Definability
The study of class definability is not new. There exist, for example, several results for first
order logic regarding the definability of classes of models. In that case, a class of models that
is definable by means of a set of first order formulas is called elementary and those that can
be defined by means of a single formula are called basic elementary classes.
To develop the theory of this section we will use a relativized version of the concept of
first order definability. It is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3.1 (C-elementary class). Let C ⊆ MODS(F).
1. A class K ⊆ C is called C-elementary (noted C-EC∆) if there exists a set of first order
formulas Γ such that for all Mf ∈ C it occurs that Mf |= Γ iff Mf ∈ K.2
2. A class K ⊆ C is called basic C-elementary (noted C-EC) if there exists a first order
formula ϕ such that for all Mf ∈ C it occurs that Mf |= ϕ iff Mf ∈ K.
Definition 4.3.2 (Elementary class). Let K ⊆ MODS(F).
1. K is called elementary (noted EC∆) if it is C-elementary for C = MODS(F).
2. K is called basic elementary (noted EC) if it is basic C-elementary for C = MODS(F).
On the modal side, we will use pointed models for a smoother proof. We need some further
definitions before stating the main theorem of this section. The concept of ‘definability’ in
the source logic is given analogously to the one of the target logic.
Definition 4.3.3 (Definability). A class M ⊆ PMODS(L) is said to be definable by a set of
formulas if there exists a set Γ of L-formulas such that 〈M, w〉 ∈ M if and only if M, w |= Γ.
Definition 4.3.4 (Closure under simulations). A class M ⊆ PMODS(L) is said to be closed
under simulations if, whenever 〈M, w〉 ∈ M, and 〈N , v〉 is an L-pointed model such that
M, w →L N , v then 〈N , v〉 ∈ M.
As in first order and BML, we distinguish between two types of classes. Those that can
be defined by a set of formulas and those that can be defined by a single formula. Here we
state the first theorem and then carry on with the second one.
Theorem 4.3.5 (Definability by a set). Given an adequate pair 〈L,K〉 and a class of pointed
models M ⊆ PMODS(L), the following are equivalent
(i) M is definable by a set of L-formulas.
(ii) M is closed under L-simulations, T(M) is closed under ultraproducts and T(M) is closed
under ultrapowers.
From i to ii. Suppose that M is defined by the set Γ of L-formulas.
2 A C-EC∆ class can be seen as the intersection of C-EC classes. The ∆ in the notation comes from the
german word Durchschnitt which means ‘cross-section’ and makes reference to this fact.
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1. Suppose now that there is a model 〈M, w〉 ∈ M such thatM, w →N , v for some pointed
model N , v. As 〈M, w〉 ∈ M it must occur that M, w |= Γ. By simulation preservation
we have N , v |= Γ therefore 〈N , v〉 ∈ M. Therefore M is closed under L-simulations.
2. To see that T(M) is closed under ultraproducts take a family of models 〈Mfi , gi〉 ∈ T(M).
Because every Mfi , gi is in T(M) we have that Mfi , gi |= Tfx(Γ) for all i. Let Mf =∏
DMfi be an ultraproduct of those models, by [CK90, Theorem 4.1.9] we have that
Mf , g∗i |= Tfx(Γ) for g∗i (x) = λz.gi(x). Therefore 〈Mf , g∗i 〉 ∈ T(M). Thus, the class is
closed under ultraproducts.3
3. We still have to check that T(M) is closed under ultrapowers. Take 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ T(M),
by definition Mf , g 6|= Tfx(Γ). Let Mf∗ =
∏
DMf be an ultrapower of Mf , by [CK90,
Corollary 4.1.10] the ultrapower is elementary equivalent to the original model. Hence,
let h(x) = λz.g(x) be the canonical mapping, Mf∗ , h 6|= Tfx(Γ). This means that
〈Mf∗ , h〉 ∈ T(M) and therefore the class is closed under ultrapowers.
From ii to i. Suppose M is closed under L-simulations, T(M) is closed under ultraproducts
and T(M) is closed under ultrapowers. Define the set Γ = Th(M). Trivially M |= Γ, we still
have to show that if M, w |= Γ then 〈M, w〉 ∈ M. Define the following set
NThw(x) = {¬Tfx(ϕ) : ϕ is an L-formula and M, w 6|= ϕ}
Let’s see that NThw(x) is finitely satisfiable in T(M). Suppose not, there is a finite subset
Σ0 ⊆ NThw(x) such that Σ0 = {¬σ1, . . . ,¬σn} is not satisfiable in T(M). That means that
the formula ψ = ¬(¬σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬σn) is valid in T(M). Observe that ψ is equivalent to
ψ′ = σ1 ∨ · · · ∨ σn. As the formula translation preserves disjunction and truth there exists an
L-formula ψ∗ such that ψ′ ≡F Tfx(ψ∗). Hence Tfx(ψ∗) is valid in T(M) and therefore ψ∗ ∈ Γ.
This is absurd because it is obvious that M, w 6|= ψ∗ and by hipothesis M, w |= Γ.
Having proved that every subset of NThw(x) is satisfiable, by relative compactness, there
is a model 〈N , v〉 ∈ M such that T(N , v) |= NThw(x). We have already proved (in Proposition
4.2.7) that these models satisfy N , v vLM, w.
Suppose that 〈M, w〉 ∈ M, using Theorem A.3 (with M1 = M and M2 = M) we can
conclude that there exist models 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ M and 〈M∗, w∗〉 ∈ M such that N ∗, v∗ →L
M∗, w∗. As M is closed under simulations then 〈M, w〉 ∈ M. Absurd, therefore 〈M, w〉 must
be in M.
Notation 4.3.6. Let 〈Mf , g〉, 〈N f , h〉 ∈ PMODS(F) we write Mf , g ∼= N f , h to mean that
there exists a potential isomorphism I betweenMf and N f such that 〈a〉I〈b〉 where a = g(x)
and b = h(x). That is, there is a potential isomorphism that links the elements assigned by
g and h.
Definition 4.3.7 (C-closure under potential isomorphisms). Let C ⊆ MODS(F). A class
K ⊆ C is C-closed under potential isomorphisms if for every Mf ∈ K and N f ∈ C such that
Mf ∼= N f then N f ∈ K.
3 This application is a corollary of The Fundamental Theorem of Ultraproducts. This same application can
be seen in the proof of Theorem’s 4.1.12 in the same book.
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The definition for pointed models is similar. Let C ⊆ PMODS(F). A class K ⊆ C is
C-closed under potential isomorphisms if for every 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ K and 〈N f , h〉 ∈ C such that
Mf , g ∼= N f , h then 〈N f , h〉 ∈ K.
Lemma 4.3.8. Let M ⊆ PMODS(L). If M is closed under L-simulations and both TK(M)
and TK(M) are closed under ultrapowers then TK(M) and TK(M) are K-closed under potential
isomorphisms.
Proof for T(M). Suppose that T(M) is not K-closed under potential isomorphisms. This
means that there exist models 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ T(M) and 〈N f , h〉 ∈ T(M) such thatMf , g ∼= N f , h.
Recall that K \T(M) = T(M). For a smoother proof, call their modal counterpartsM, w and
N , v respectively. Therefore 〈M, w〉 ∈ M and 〈N , v〉 /∈ M.
As Mf , g ∼= N f , h we know by [CK90, Proposition 2.4.4] that Mf , g |= ϕ(x) if and
only if N f , h |= ϕ(x). In particular they have the same modal theory, M, w ≡L N , v. As
this implies that M, w vL N , v we can use Theorem A.3 (instantiating with K1 = T(M),
K2 = T(M) and M, N interchanged) and get models 〈M∗, w∗〉 ∈ M and 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ M such
that M∗, w∗ →L N ∗, v∗.
Knowing thatM∗, w∗ →L N ∗, v∗ and that M is closed under simulations we conclude that
〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ M. This is absurd because it contradicts 〈N ∗, v∗〉 ∈ M. Hence TK(M) is K-closed
under potential isomorphisms.
Proof for T(M). To see that T(M) is K-closed under potential isomorphisms we argue by
contradicction. Suppose not, then there exist 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ T(M) and 〈N f , h〉 ∈ K \ T(M) such
that Mf , g ∼= N f , h. As 〈N f , h〉 ∈ K \ T(M) this means that 〈N f , h〉 ∈ T(M). We have
just proved that T(M) is K-closed under potential isomorphism then, as Mf , g ∼= N f , h, we
conclude that 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ T(M) which contradicts our hypothesis.4 Absurd.
Theorem 4.3.9 (Definability by a single formula). Given an adequate pair 〈L,K〉, and a
class of models M ⊆ MODS(L), the following are equivalent
(i). M is definable by a single L-formula.
(ii). M is closed under L-simulations and both T(M) and T(M) are closed under ultraprod-
ucts.
From i to ii. Suppose M is definable by a single L-formula ϕ.
1. Let’s see that T(M) and T(M) are closed under ultraproducts. Recall that M is definable
by a single L-formula ϕ. Take the class of first order models defined by Tfx(ϕ) and call
it Me. Observe that Me can be expressed as the disjunct union Me = T(M) ∪ M′
between the translation of M and some other models that do not fall in K. Therefore
T(M) = Me ∩ K = MODS(¬Tfx(ϕ)) ∩ K. The following diagram helps illustrate the
different classes. The box represents the class of all F models, K is the class with an
irregular border and Me is the oval.
4 Here we use the symmetry of the potential isomorphism relation.
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Using Theorem 4.3.5, as M is defined by the singleton set T = {ϕ}, T(M) is closed under
ultraproducts. To see that T(M) is closed under ultraproducts proceed as follows.
(a) As K is closed under ultraproducts then, any ultraproduct from K must reside in K.
In particular, any ultraproduct from T(M) must reside in K.
(b) As Me is defined by ¬Tfx(ϕ), it is closed under ultraproducts [CK90, Corollary
6.1.16]. This means that any ultraproduct from Me must reside in Me, in particular,
any ultraproduct from T(M) must reside in Me.
From (a) and (b) we can conclude that any ultraproduct from T(M) must be in K∩Me =
T(M).
2. Using Theorem 4.3.5, as M is defined by the singleton set T = {ϕ} we can be sure that
M is closed under L-simulations.
From ii to i. Suppose that M is closed under L-simulations and both T(M) and T(M) are
closed under ultraproducts. Using Theorem 4.3.5 we have a set of formulas Γ defining M. By
Lemma 4.3.8 T(M) and T(M) are K-closed under potential isomorphisms. Now we use the
relativized version of first order’s definability result, Theorem A.2, and conclude that there
is a first order formula α(x) such that for every 〈Mf , g〉 ∈ K; Mf , g |= α(x) if and only if
〈Mf , g〉 ∈ T(M).
As M is closed under L-simulations then α is K-invariant for L-simulations. Using the
Characterization Theorem (Theorem 4.2.3) we can conclude that α(x) is K-equivalent to the
translation of a modal formula ϕ. Therefore there exists ϕ that defines M.
5. APPLICATIONS
In this chapter we will use the results that we have developed in the previous chapters and
derive the characterization and definability theorems for particular cases of modal logics.
5.1 Memory Logics
Memory logics are a novel family of modal logics introduced in [AFFM08]. They allow to
model dynamic behavior through explicit memory operators that change the evaluating struc-
ture. This proposal introduces a framework for studying the notion of state in a more general
way, without bounding the analysis to any fixed domain (like knowledge change, time flow,
linguistics contexts, etc.). Most of the work that has been done in this direction implicitly
adds some specific native behavior in the “dynamic component”. The approach presented in
this paper wants to study some of the dynamic capabilities of the above mentioned approaches
from a more abstract point of view, and analyze the different aspects of this family in terms
of logic properties.
This family of logics present several “memory operators” that can be considered modularly.
We first present the syntax, signature and models for a broad set of operators and then analyze
different possible combinations which form interesting logics.
It is important to note that there are no Characterization and Definability results known
for this family of logics at this moment. Therefore, the results obtained through the use of
the framework that we’ve developed will be original. We present the results for the unimodal
case but it can be easily generalized for the multi-modal case.
Definition 5.1.1 (Signatures). Let prop = {p1, p2, . . . } (the propositional symbols) be a
countable infinite set of symbols and rel = {r} (the relational symbols) be disjoint. The
source signature is defined to be S = 〈prop,rel〉.
Let fprop = {P1, P2, . . . } (the propositional predicates) and frel = {R} (the relational
predicates) The target first-order signature is defined to be T = 〈fprop ∪ frel, ∅, ∅〉 with
equality.
Definition 5.1.2 (Syntax). The syntax of the Memory Logics family over a given signa-
ture 〈prop,rel〉 is defined as an extension of the propositional calculus with the following
operators:
ϕ ::= · · · | ©k | ©rϕ | ©eϕ | ©fϕ | 〈r〉ϕ | 〈〈r〉〉ϕ
where r ∈ rel. We define the dual of 〈〈r〉〉 in the usual way: for all r ∈ rel, [[r]]ϕ can be
defined as ¬〈〈r〉〉¬ϕ. We usually call these operators ‘known’, ‘remember’, ‘erase’, ‘forget’ and
‘double diamond’. Every logic of this family will be required to have at least the ©r and ©k
operators and can have any combination of the other operators.
Observe that, defined this way, in the family of memory logics one has two types of
diamonds: the ‘single’ diamond of BML and the ‘double diamond’. The semantic of the first
is defined as usual and the later will be defined shortly.
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The family of memory logics that we will be working with are all evaluated in an extension
of Kripke models with a set that we call the ‘memory’ of the model. It is defined as follows,
along with its first-order equivalent.
Definition 5.1.3 (Models). A model for the source language over the signature S is a tuple
M = 〈W,R, V, S〉 satisfying
(i) W is a nonempty set,
(ii) R ⊆W ×W is a binary relation over W ,
(iii) V : prop→ P (W ) is a valuation function, and
(iv) S ⊆W is the memory of the model.
An F-model for the target language is a tuple Mt = 〈W t, Rt, (P ti )i∈fprop,K〉 where
(i) W t is a nonempty set,
(ii) K ⊆W ,
(iii) Rt ⊆W t ×W t is a binary relation over W t, and
(iv) (P ti )i∈fprop are unary relations over W
t.
Notation 5.1.4. In the rest of this section the following notation will be useful. Let M =
〈W,R, V, S〉 be a model, w ∈W , and S′ ⊆W then we define
M[+w] = 〈W,R, V, S ∪ {w}〉
M[−w] = 〈W,R, V, S \ {w}〉
M[+S′] = 〈W,R, V, S ∪ S′〉
M[−S′] = 〈W,R, V, S \ S′〉
M[∗] = 〈W,R, V, ∅〉.
We usually write M[w] instead of M[+w].
Definition 5.1.5 (Semantics). Given a model M = 〈W,R, V, S〉 and w ∈ W , we extend the
propositional part of the semantics presented in Definition 1.2.4 with the following rules:
M, w |=©k iff w ∈ S
M, w |=©rϕ iff M[w], w |= ϕ
M, w |=©fϕ iff M[−w], w |= ϕ
M, w |=©eϕ iff M[∗], w |= ϕ
M, w |= 〈r〉ϕ iff ∃w′ ∈W,wRw′ and M, w′ |= ϕ.
M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕ iff ∃w′ ∈W,wRw′ and M[w], w′ |= ϕ.
Observe that the double diamond acts as a normal diamond but it always remembers the
current state before moving. Hence, it can be thought as if the formula were leaving a trace
while being evaluated in the model.
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Definition 5.1.6 (Formula translation). We will not give an explicit translation for these
logics, as we will not use it explicitly. We know there exists a translation to F1= because,
in [AFFM08], there is an explicit translation from memory logics to HL and there is a trans-
lation from HL to F1= given in [BvBW06]. This translation preserves both conjunction and
disjunction as needed. Let’s call it Tfx : FORM(S)→ FORM(T ).
Definition 5.1.7 (Model translation). Let K be the class of all models for the signature
T . Let M = 〈W,R, V, S〉 and Mt = 〈W t, Rt, (P ti )i∈fprop,K〉. Define the model translation
TK(M, w) = 〈Mt, gt〉 to be the function induced by the following equations
W t = W
P ti = V (pi)
K = S
Rt = R
gt(x) = w
The simulation notion for a logic of this family allows a very modular definition. Let ∼ be
a binary relation between memory pointed models. So ∼ relates tuples 〈M,m〉 with 〈N , n〉.
A simulation for a memory logic L can be defined imposing restrictions to ∼ depending
on the operators that L has. In the following table we summarize the restrictions associated
with each operator. We write SM to refer to the memory of the model M. R1r is used to
denote a relation in M and R2r is used to denote a relation in N .
always (nontriv) ∼ is not empty.
always (agree) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, thenm and nmake the same propositional
variables true.
©k (kagree) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, then m ∈ SM if and only if n ∈ SN .
©r (remember) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, then 〈M[m],m〉 ∼ 〈N [n], n〉.
©f (forget) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, then 〈M[−m],m〉 ∼ 〈N [−n], n〉.
©e (erase) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, then 〈M[∗],m〉 ∼ 〈N [∗], n〉.
〈r〉 (forth) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉 and R1r(m,m′), then there exists n′ ∈ |N |
such that R2r(n, n
′) and 〈M,m′〉 ∼ 〈N , n′〉.
(back) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉 and R2r(n, n′), then there exists m′ ∈ |M|
such that R1r(m,m
′) and 〈M,m′〉 ∼ 〈N , n′〉.
〈〈r〉〉 (mforth) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉 and R1r(m,m′), then there exists n′ ∈ |N |
such that R2r(n, n
′) and 〈M[m],m′〉 ∼ 〈N [n], n′〉.
(mback) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉 and R2r(n, n′), then there exists m′ ∈ |M|
such that R1r(m,m
′) and 〈M[m],m′〉 ∼ 〈N [n], n′〉.
Fig. 5.1: Operator restrictions for a modular memory simulation definition.
Definition 5.1.8 (Memory simulation). From now on, given a memory logic L, we will refer
as ‘the simulation for L’ to the simulation defined by the sum of the necessary conditions of
Figure 5.1 for the operators in L.
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Observe that, as every memory logic has negation, the simulation notion for memory
logics will be symmetrical. Therefore we will use the bisimulation symbol ↔ to note memory
simulations.
Example 5.1.9. To give some examples of possible memory logics we cite the following ones
which are named in [Mer09].
ML(〈r〉) = {©r ,©k , 〈r〉}
ML(〈〈r〉〉) = {©r ,©k , 〈〈r〉〉}
ML(〈r〉,©f ) = {©r ,©k ,©f , 〈r〉}
ML(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) = {©r ,©k ,©f , 〈〈r〉〉}
ML(〈r〉,©e ) = {©r ,©k ,©e , 〈r〉}
ML(〈〈r〉〉,©e ) = {©r ,©k ,©e , 〈〈r〉〉}
ML(〈r〉,©f ,©e ) = {©r ,©k ,©f ,©e , 〈r〉}
It is clear from the satisfaction definition of each operator that these logics have different
capabilities. A detailed insight on the expressive power of these logics can be found in the
aforementioned PhD. thesis.
Theorem 5.1.10. Let L be a memory logic, let 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 be two memory models.
If 〈M, w〉 ↔L 〈N , v〉 then 〈M, w〉 ≡L 〈N , v〉.
Proof. Part of the proof can be found in [Mer09], it can be easily extended to he full set of
operators. We will not present this proof here as it exceeds the focus of this thesis.
Before starting with the proof of the main theorem of this section we will prove some
lemmas that will be useful. The model may change during the evaluation of a formula. For
our special case, it will be enough to prove that adding a state to the memory preserves
ω-saturation.
Lemma 5.1.11. If M is ω-saturated then M[+A] is ω-saturated too for all finite A ⊆ |M|.
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be found in [Mer09, Lemma 5.2.2].
Lemma 5.1.12. Let M = 〈W,R, . . .〉 be a ω-saturated Kripke model whose translation
preserves the structure of the domain and the relations, that is, T(M) = 〈W,R, . . .〉 where
R ⊆W ×W .
Let Σ be a set of modal formulas and w ∈W . If every finite subset ∆ ⊆ Σ satisfies
M, v∆ |= ∆ where v∆ is an R-successor of w then there exists v, an R-successor of w, such
that M, v |= Σ.
Proof. Recall that the definition of ω-saturation lets us extend the first order language with
a constant a for each element a ∈W . Define Σ∗ = {Rwx} ∪ Tfx(Σ).
If we show that Σ∗ is satisfiable in some pointed model T(M, v) it is clear that Σ will be
satisfiable in a successor of w. This is because the domain and relations ofM and T(M) are
the same and if T(M) |= Rwx[a] this means that a is a successor of w. The rest of the proof
will focus on proving that Σ∗ is satisfiable in the pointed model T(M, v).
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Take a finite subset Σ0 ⊆ Σ∗. Observe that this set should satisfy the following inclusion
Σ0 ⊆ {Rwx, σ1, . . . , σn} with σi ∈ Tfx(Σ). Therefore, if we show that this bigger set is
satisfiable, it will also be the case with Σ0.
By hypothesis, every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in a successor of w. Take the finite
subset ∆ such that Tfx(∆) = {σ1, . . . , σn}. This ∆ is satisfiable in some successor v∆ which
means that R(w, v∆). We can conclude that T(M, v∆) |= Rwx and T(M, v∆) |= Tfx(∆).
We have taken an arbitrary finite subset of Σ∗ and shown that it is satisfiable. By ω-
saturation we can conclude that the set Σ∗ is also satisfiable.
To be able to derive the characterization and definability results using the framework
developed in the previous chapters we need to prove that, for every memory logic L, the class
of ω-saturated models has the Hennessy-Milner property with respect to L-simulations. Each
logic will have its own definition of simulation with the proper restrictions listed above.
As we want to consider all the possible logics from the family of memory logics we will
need to prove that, given two models 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉 such that 〈M, w〉 ≡L 〈N , v〉 we
can construct an L-simulation between them. We will do this by considering every possible
operator and show that we can construct a simulation that satisfies the constraints associated
for that operator.
Theorem 5.1.13. Let L be a memory logic, the class of ω-saturated models has the Hennessy-
Milner property with respect to L-simulations.
Proof. Given two ω-saturated modelsM, N it suffices to give an L-simulation between them.
We propose the binary relation ∼ defined as
〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉 iff M, w ≡L N , v
Suppose that 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉. We first show that this relation satisfies the (nontriv) and
(agree) restrictions which apply for every combination of operators, then we will undertake
the proof for each special operator.
Basic restrictions. We can see that if we are given two equivalent worlds in two different
models then, by definition, the relation will have at least one element and therefore (nontriv)
will be satisfied. Also, the definition of the relation implies that w and v make true the same
propositional variables and therefore (agree) is satisfied.
Restrictions for ©k . We need to show that w is known in M if and only if v is known in
N . The proof goes through easily using the satisfaction definition of the known operator
w ∈ SM ⇐⇒ M, w |=©k ⇐⇒ N , v |=©k ⇐⇒ v ∈ SN .
The first and last implications are because of the semantics of©k , the implication in the middle
is because of L-equivalence between w and v. This proves that (kagree) is satisfied.
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Restrictions for ©r . As we suppose that 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉 then for every ϕ we have
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ N , v |= ϕ
so, given a formula ψ we can instantiate the equivalence and get
M, w |=©rψ ⇐⇒ N , v |=©rψ
which by satisfaction definition holds precisely when
M[+w], w |= ψ ⇐⇒ N [+v], v |= ψ
that means that those two states are equivalent and we can conclude (by def. of ∼) that
〈M[w], w〉 ∼ 〈N [v], v〉
This proves that (remember) is satisfied.
Restrictions for ©f . As in the last paragraph, for every ϕ we have
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ N , v |= ϕ
so, given a formula ψ we can instantiate the equivalence and get
M, w |=©fψ ⇐⇒ N , v |=©fψ
which by satisfaction definition holds precisely when
M[−w], w |= ψ ⇐⇒ N [−v], v |= ψ
that means that those two states are equivalent and we can conclude (by def. of ∼) that
〈M[−w], w〉 ∼ 〈N [−v], v〉
This proves that (forget) is satisfied.
Restrictions for ©e . We proceed as usual, for every ϕ we have
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ N , v |= ϕ
so, given a formula ψ we can instantiate the equivalence and get
M, w |=©eψ ⇐⇒ N , v |=©eψ
which by satisfaction definition holds precisely when
M[∗], w |= ψ ⇐⇒ N [∗], v |= ψ
that means that those two states are equivalent and we can conclude (by def. of ∼) that
〈M[∗], w〉 ∼ 〈N [∗], v〉
This proves that (erase) is satisfied.
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Restrictions for 〈r〉. As we have 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉 then M, w ≡ N , v. Suppose that w′
is a successor of w. Let Σ be the set of all the formulas true at M, w′. For every finite
subset ∆ ⊆ Σ we have M, w′ |= ∧∆ and therefore M, w |= 3∧∆. By L-equivalence we
have N , v |= 3∧∆ which means that for every ∆ we have a v-succesor which satisfies it. By
Lemma 5.1.12 we can conclude that there exists v′ a v-succesor so that N , v′ |= Σ.
As M, w′ and N , v′ make the same formulas true then they are L-equivalent and by
definition they will be related by the simulation. We conclude that 〈M, w′〉 ∼ 〈N , v′〉. This
proves that (forth) is satisfied. The proof for (back) is similar but switching the models.
An alternative proof of this lemma, which uses a notion called m-saturation, can be found
in [BdRV01].
Restrictions for 〈〈r〉〉. As we have 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉 then for every ϕ we have
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ N , v |= ϕ
therefore if, given an arbitrary ψ we instantiate ϕ =©rψ we get1
M,m |=©rψ ⇐⇒ N , n |=©rψ
which, by satisfaction definition holds exactly when
M[m],m |= ψ ⇐⇒ N [n], n |= ψ (5.1)
Observe that equation 5.1 implies that M[m],m ≡L N [n], n. Using Lemma 5.1.11 we also
know that 〈M[m],m〉 and 〈N [n], n〉 are both ω-saturated.
Suppose that w′ is a successor of w. Let Σ be the set of all the formulas true atM[w], w′.
For every finite subset ∆ ⊆ Σ we have M[w], w′ |= ∧∆ and therefore M[w], w |= 〈〈r〉〉∧∆.
By L-equivalence we have N [v], v |= 〈〈r〉〉∧∆ which means that for every ∆ we have a v-
succesor which satisfies it. By Lemma 5.1.12 we can conclude that there exists v′ a v-succesor
so that N [v], v′ |= Σ.
As M[w], w′ and N [n], v′ make the same formulas true then they are L-equivalent and
by definition they will be related by the simulation. This proves that (mforth) is satisfied
because 〈M[w], w′〉 ∼ 〈N [v], v′〉. The proof for (mback) is similar but switching the models.
After analyzing all the possible operators we have shown that, for every case, the L-
simulation relation will satisfied the required constraints. This proves that given two ω-
saturated L-equivalent models we are able to construct an L-simulation between them. There-
fore, the ω-saturated class of models has the Hennessy-Milner property with respect to L-
simulations.
Corollary 5.1.14. The definitions given above, along with Theorem 5.1.13, prove that the
pair 〈L,K〉 is an adequate pair for every memory logic L. Therefore, the Characterization
and Definability theorems (4.2.3, 4.3.5 and 4.3.9) hold for this family of logics. In particular,
these theorems hold for the logics in Example 5.1.9.
1 We can use ‘remember’ here because we required that every memory logic should have it. Without this
requirement we would’ve been able to use only 〈〈r〉〉.
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5.2 Hybrid Logics
Hybrid Logics augment modal logics with machinery for describing and reasoning about iden-
tity, which is a crucial in many settings. The notion of identity comes with the introduction
of ‘nominals’ and operators to reason about them. In spirit, nominals work mostly as propo-
sitional variables but they have the particularity of being true in at most one point. We start
by defining the signatures for these logics.
Definition 5.2.1 (Signatures). Let prop = {p1, p2, . . . } (the propositional symbols), nom =
{i1, i2, . . . } (the nominal symbols) and rel = {r1, r2, . . . } (the relational symbols) be disjoint,
countable infinite sets of symbols. The source signature is defined to be S = 〈prop,rel,nom〉.
Let fprop = {P1, P2, . . . } (the propositional predicates), frel = {R1, R2, . . . } (the rela-
tional predicates) and fconst = {c1, c2, . . . } (the constants). The target first-order signature
is defined to be T = 〈fprop ∪ frel, fconst, ∅〉 with equality.
In this thesis we will (re)prove the characterization and definability theorem for a small
family of hybrid logics. We will only consider the cases which extend BML with nominals
and possibly the @ operator. There exist other hybrid important logics such as, for example,
the ones which include the downarrow binder ↓. Results for these logics are nicely developed
in [BvBW06, Chapter 12].
Definition 5.2.2 (Syntax). The syntax of the Hybrid Logic family over a given signature
〈prop,rel,nom〉 is defined as an extension of the propositional calculus with the following
operators:
ϕ ::= · · · | i | @iϕ | 〈r〉ϕ
where i ∈ nom and r ∈ rel. We define the dual of 〈r〉 in the usual way.
Definition 5.2.3 (Models). A hybrid model for the source language is a tuple
M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V,G〉
which satisfies
(i) W is a nonempty set,
(ii) Rr ⊆W ×W are binary relations over W ,
(iii) V : prop→ P (W ) is a valuation function, and
(iv) G : nom→W is an assignment for the nominals.2
An F-model for the target language is a tuple
Mt = 〈W t, (Rtr)r∈frel, (P ti )i∈fprop, (cti)i∈fconst〉
which satisfies
2 In the literature one can find an equivalent definition where V : prop∪nom → P (W ) and G doesn’t exist.
In this case we should add V (i) = |1| for all i ∈ nom as a restriction. It is easy to see that this two definitions
are equivalent.
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(i) W t is a nonempty set,
(ii) Rtr ⊆W t ×W t are binary relations over W t,
(iii) (P ti )i∈fprop are unary relations over W
t, and
(iv) cti are constants.
Definition 5.2.4 (Semantics). Given a model M = 〈W,R, V,G〉 and w ∈W , we extend the
semantics presented in Definition 1.2.4 (BML semantics) with the following rules:
M, w |= i iff w = i
M, w |= @iϕ iff M, G(i) |= ϕ
Observe that the satisfaction definition for the nominals acts as an identity checker and
the @-operator lets us ‘jump’ to an identified world.
Definition 5.2.5 (Formula translation). A formula translation that meets our requirements
is given in [BdRV01, BvBW06]. We will not give the explicit definition because we will not
need to use it.
Definition 5.2.6 (Model translation). Let K be the class of all first order models over the
target signature T . Let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V,G〉 and
Mt = 〈W t, (Rtr)r∈frel, (P ti )i∈fprop, (cti)i∈fconst〉.
Define the model translation TK(M, w) = 〈Mt, gt〉 to be the function induced by the following
equations
W t = W
P ti = V (pi) for pi ∈ prop
cti = G(i) for i ∈ nom
Rti = Ri
gt(x) = w
As with memory logics, the small family of hybrid logics that we will analyze also allows
a modular simulation definition. Let ∼ be a binary relation between hybrid pointed models.
A simulation for a hybrid logic L can be defined imposing restrictions to ∼ depending on the
operators that L has. It is important to stress that every hybrid logic should have nominals.
In the following table we summarize the restrictions associated with each operator. We write
G1 for the nominal assignment of M and G2 for the nominal assignment of N .
nominals (nagree) If 〈M,m〉 ∼ 〈N , n〉, then G1(i) = m if and only if
G2(i) = n for all i ∈ nom.
@ (nom) If G1(i) = w and G2(i) = v for some i ∈ nom then
〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉.
Fig. 5.2: Operator restrictions for a modular hybrid simulation definition.
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Definition 5.2.7 (Hybrid simulation). From now on, given a hybrid logic L, we will refer
as ‘the simulation for L’ to the simulation defined by the sum of the necessary conditions of
Figure 5.2 for the operators in L and the (nontriv) and (agree).
Theorem 5.2.8. Let L be a hybrid logic defined as in Definition 5.2.2, let 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉
be two hybrid models. If 〈M, w〉 ↔L 〈N , v〉 then 〈M, w〉 ≡L 〈N , v〉.
Proof. The proof of this theorem can be found in [BvBW06].
In the following theorem we will prove that the ω-saturated class of models has the
Hennessy-Milner property with respect to the simulations for the following hybrid logics.
HL = {nominals, 〈r〉}
HL(@) = {nominals, 〈r〉,@}
We will achieve this by showning that, given two equivalent pointed hybrid models, we can
construct a simulation between them.
Theorem 5.2.9. Let L be a hybrid logic as in Definition 5.2.2, the class of ω-saturated
models has the Hennessy-Milner property with respect to L-simulations.
Proof. Given two ω-saturated modelsM, N it suffices to give an L-simulation between them.
We propose the binary relation ∼ defined as
〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉 iff M, w ≡L N , v
Suppose that 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉. The proof for the (nontriv), (agree), (forth) and (back)
restrictions are the same as for memory logics (see Theorem 5.1.13). We prove the restrictions
for nominals and the @ operator.
Restrictions for nominals. This proof goes through using the satisfaction definition for
the nominals. Remember that the nominals can only be true in one world.
GM(i) = w ⇐⇒ M, w |= i ⇐⇒ N , v |= i ⇐⇒ GN (i) = v
the first and last implications are because of the semantics of nominal satisfaction and the
implication in the middle is because of the L-equivalence between 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉.
Restrictions for @. Suppose that G1(i) = w and G2(i) = v. As the relation is non-empty
we can always get two equivalent worlds a ∈ |M| and b ∈ |N |. Then we have
M, a |= ϕ iff N , b |= ϕ
for all ϕ. Given an arbitrary formula ψ we can instantiate ϕ = @iψ thus obtaining
M, a |= @iψ iff N , b |= @iψ
which by semantic definition means that
M, G1(i) |= ψ iff N , G2(i) |= ψ.
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By hypothesis we can replace G1(i) and G2(i) and get
M, w |= ψ iff N , v |= ψ
therefore M, w ≡L N , v and by definition 〈M, w〉 ∼ 〈N , v〉.
After analyzing all the possible operators we have shown that, for every case, the L-
simulation relation will satisfy the required constraints. This proves that given two ω-
saturated L-equivalent models we are able to construct an L-simulation between them. There-
fore, the ω-saturated class of models has the Hennessy-Milner property with respect to L-
simulations.
Corollary 5.2.10. The definitions given above, along with Theorem 5.2.9, prove that the
pair 〈L,K〉 is an adequate pair for every hybrid logic L. Therefore, the Characterization and
Definability theorems (4.2.3, 4.3.5 and 4.3.9) hold for this family of logics.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
When developing a notion of simulation for a given logic L we need to be sure that we end up
with the adequate notion. This means that it should exactly characterize model equivalence.
If we prove that
If 〈M, w〉 ∼L 〈N , v〉 then M, w vL N , v (6.1)
we have the half of the work done but the notion could still be wrong. Suppose that, for
example, we say that the right notion of simulation for BML- is the bisimulation notion of
BML. It is obvious that we will be able to prove (6.1) but we are not working with the right
notion of simulation: is is too strong for BML-.
In the process of finding the right simulation notion, candidates are often checked ‘against’
finite or finitely branching models. In those cases, one expects to be able to prove the converse
of (6.1). As we have seen, these classes of models are special cases of ω-saturated models. In
the development of this thesis we arrive to the conclusion that if we can prove the converse
of (6.1) for any ω-saturated model then we can, with little work, derive the Characterization
and Definability theorems. This observation stresses the important relationship of ω-saturated
models and the right simulation notion for a given logic.
When we defined the notion of adequate pair in Definition 4.1.1 we explained the strength
of the Hennessy-Milner requirement. One would expect that a true generalization of the
Characterization and Definability theorem doesn’t require the proof of a lemma. Instead, it
should give a series of easily checkable properties that a logic should satisfy.
In sake of trying to give a result that could handle a broad spectrum of simulation notions
we faced a big problem: we had no information regarding the structural properties of a
simulation. In the applications chapter we saw that this information was essential to prove
that ω-saturated models had the Hennesy-Milner property.
We think that an important line of work lies in the effort of trying to prove the Hennessy-
Milner property without much information about the simulation notion. In future work we
plan to integrate the results of this thesis with an approach similar to the one presented
in [AG10], where coinductive model semantics are given.
Recall that in the beginning of Chapter 3 we presented two equivalent definitions of the
‘Basic Temporal Logic’. The classical one had custom made modalities F and P and the
alternative view considered them as normal diamonds over a restricted class of models. The
work done by Areces and Gor´ın in [AG10] generalizes this idea for (almost) any modality
which can be defined with the pattern of the diamond operator (∀∃).
From our perspective, the most important point of their work is that, by restricting the
class of models, we get a unique notion of model equivalence for every logic that fits in their
framework. The right simulation notion turns to be the same as BML’s bisimulation.
As far as we know, to the moment, there was no direct way to prove Characterization
and Definability results using the framework developed in [AG10]. The problem laid in the
restriction applied to the class of models, there is no classical proof which takes this kind of
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restrictions into account. With the results developed in this thesis it should be easy to prove
a more general result using their framework.
Good as it is, the framework developed in [AG10] has its limits. Not every modality
can be expressed with the pattern of a diamond. For example, there exists an extension of
basic temporal logic which adds the Since and Until operators [BvBW06]. This operators
don’t respect the pattern of the definition of a normal diamond and therefore don’t fit in the
framework.
We think that one of the most exciting ways to continue this work is to try to expand the
framework developed by Areces and Gor´ın to support more types of operators. This would
allow us to give a ‘canonical’ simulation notion for a broader set of logics and therefore be
able to prove the Hennessy-Milner property for them.
This line of work definitely looks as a promising path to give an automatic derivation of
the Characterization and Definability theorems for a greater set of modal logics.
APPENDIX A: AUXILIARY RESULTS
Theorem A.1 (First order compactness relative to a class of models). Let C be a class of
first-order models which is closed under ultraproducts and let Σ be a set of first order formulas.
If every finite set ∆ ⊆ Σ has a model in C then there is a model in C for Σ.
Proof. LetMfi be a model for each finite subset ∆i ⊆ Σ, algebraic proofs of the compactness
theorem [Kei08, Theorem 4.3] show that the ultraproduct of the modelsM =∏UMfi satisfies
M |= Σ.1 As each Mfi is in C and C is closed under ultraproducts we conclude that M ∈
C.
Theorem A.2 (First order definability relative to a class of models). Let C be a class of
first-order models which is closed under ultraproducts and let K ⊆ C.
(i) K is a C-elementary class (noted C-EC∆) if and only if K is closed under ultraproducts,
K is C-closed under potential isomorphisms and K ∩ C is closed under ultrapowers.
(ii) K is a basic C-elementary class (noted C-EC) if and only if both K and K∩C are closed
under ultraproducts and C-closed under potential isomorphisms.
Proof. Left to right directions are left to the reader. Let’s prove right-to-left directions.
(i) Let C be a class of first-order models which is closed under ultraproducts, let K ⊆ C be
such that K is closed under ultraproducts, K is C-closed under potential isomorphisms
and K ∩ C is closed under ultrapowers.
Let Γ = {ϕ : |=K ϕ}, we show that Γ defines K. For the easy part, take a modelMf ∈ K.
By definition of Γ we have that Mf |= Γ.
For the hard part, let Mf ∈ C be such that Mf |= Γ. Define the first order theory of
the model Mf as
Σ = {ϕ : ϕ is a sentence and Mf |= ϕ}.
Let’s see that there is a model for Σ which lays in K. Suppose not, by Theorem A.1
there is a finite subset Σ0 = {σ1, . . . , σn} of Σ which is unsatisfiable in K. Hence,
|=K ¬(σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ σn) which means that ¬(σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ σn) ∈ Γ. AsMf |= Γ we arrive to an
absurd. We have proved that there exists N f ∈ K such that N f |= Σ.
By [CK90, Theorem 6.1.15], Mf ≡F N f if and only if there exist ultrapowers Mf∗
and N f∗ such that Mf∗ ∼= N f∗ . Because K is closed under ultraproducts, in particular
it is closed under ultrapowers, therefore, N f∗ ∈ K. As both classes are closed under
ultrapowers,Mf andMf∗ belong to the same class. Last but not least, as K is C-closed
under potential isomorphisms and Mf∗ ∼= N f∗ then Mf∗ ∈ K. Finally we conclude that
Mf ∈ K.
1 With a suitable ultrafilter U .
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(ii) Let C be a class of first-order models which is closed under ultraproducts, let K ⊆ C be
such that both K and K∩C are closed under ultraproducts and C-closed under potential
isomorphisms.
By (i) we know there exist two sets Γ,Γc respectively defining K and K∩C. Observe that
the union Γ∪Γc is not satisfiable in C. By Theorem A.1 there exists a finite subset Σ0 ⊆
Γ ∪ Γc which is unsatisfiable in C. Call Σ0 = {α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βm} with αi ∈ Γ and
βj ∈ Γc. As Σ0 is unsatisfiable in C this means that |=C α1∧· · ·∧αn → ¬(β1∧· · ·∧βm).
Let’s see that it is exactly ϕ = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn that defines K.
Let Mf ∈ C. If Mf ∈ K then trivially Mf |= ϕ. Suppose Mf |= ϕ then Mf 6|=
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm therefore Mf 6|= Γc hence Mf /∈ K ∩ C. We conclude that Mf ∈ K.
Theorem A.3. Let 〈L,K〉 be an adequate pair and let M1,M2 ⊆ MODS(L) be two classes
such that T(M1) and T(M2) are closed under ultrapowers. Let M ∈ M1 and N ∈ M2 be two
L-models such that for some w ∈ |M|, v ∈ |N | they satisfy N , v vL M, w then there exist
models M∗ ∈ M1 and N ∗ ∈ M2 and elements w∗ ∈ |M∗|, v∗ ∈ |N ∗| such that
1. T(M, w) ≡F T(M∗, w∗) and T(N , v) ≡F T(N ∗, v∗)
Their translations are pairwise elementary equivalent.
2. M, w ≡LM∗, w∗ and N , v ≡L N ∗, v∗
They are pairwise equivalent.
3. N ∗, v∗ →LM∗, w∗
There is a simulation from N ∗, v∗ to M∗, w∗.
Proof. We define some names for the models which we will be working on before starting with
the proof. Call Mf , gw = T(M, w) and Nf , gv = T(N , v). Take M+f ,N+f to be ω-saturated
ultrapowers of Mf and Nf (their existance is proved in Theorem B.7). As the classes are
closed under ultrapowers the saturated models are in the same class as their originators.
By [CK90, Corollary 4.1.13] we have an elementary embedding d : |Mf | → |M+f |. Let g+w
be an assignment for M+f such that g+w (x) = d(gw(x)). Take the modal preimage of M+f , g+w
and call it M∗, w∗ = T-1(M+f , g+w ). We make the same process and assign similar names to
models and points deriving from N .
1. As a corollary of [CK90, Corollary 4.1.13], as there is an elementary embedding, we
have that Mf , gw ≡FM+f , g+w . The same proof works with Nf and N+f .
2. Following the last point, we can conclude, through the translations’ truth-preservation,
that M, w ≡L M∗, w∗. The same proof works with N , v and N ∗, v∗. Corollary:
N ∗, v∗ vLM∗, w∗.
3. As both M+f and N+f are ω-saturated, by definition of adequate pair, that implies
that they have the Hennesy-Milner property. Therefore, because we’ve just proved that
N ∗, v∗ vLM∗, w∗ we can conclude that N ∗, v∗ →LM∗, w∗.
APPENDIX B: FILTERS AND ULTRAPRODUCTS
The ultraproduct construction is a uniform method of building models of first order theories
which has applications in many areas of mathematics. It is attractive because it is algebraic
in nature, but preserves all properties expressible in first order logic. In this section we will
make a brief summary of the tools presented in [Kei08] with some additional notes that may
guide the reader. Unless explicitly stated the proofs can be checked in the publication that
we’ve just mentioned.
Definition B.1 (Filter, proper filter, ultrafilter). Let I be a non-empty set.
A filter U over I is a set of subsets of I such that:
(i) I ∈ U .
(ii) U is closed under supersets; if X ∈ U and X ⊆ Y then Y ∈ U .
(iii) U is closed under finite intersections; if X ∈ U and Y ∈ U then X ∩ Y ∈ U .
A proper filter over I is a filter U over I such that:
(iv) ∅ /∈ U .
An ultrafilter over I is a proper filter U over I such that:
(v) For each X ⊆ I exactly one of X, I\X belongs to U .
Theorem B.2 (Ultrafilter Theorem, Tarski). Every proper filter over the set I can be ex-
tended to an ultrafilter over I.
We first define the ultraproduct operation on sets. Let U be an ultrafilter over I, and for
each i ∈ I let Ai be a non-empty set. The ultraproduct
∏
U Ai is obtained by first taking the
cartesian product C =
∏
i∈I Ai. Observe that C is the set of all functions f such that for
each i ∈ I, f(i) ∈ Ai. We continue by identifying elements which are equal for U -almost all
i ∈ I. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition B.3 (U -equivalence). Let U be an ultrafilter over I. Two elements f, g of the
cartesian product
∏
i∈I Ai are said to be U -equivalent, noted f =U g, if the set {i : f(i) = g(i)}
belongs to U . The U -equivalence class of f is the set fU = {g : f =U g}.
Definition B.4 (Ultraproduct of sets). Let U be an ultrafilter over I, the ultraproduct of
sets
∏
U Ai is defined as the set of U -equivalence classes∏
U
Ai = {fU : f ∈
∏
i∈I
Ai}.
An ultrapower of sets of A modulo U is defined as the ultraproduct
∏
U A =
∏
U Ai where
Ai = A for each i ∈ I. The natural or cannonical embedding is the mapping d : A →
∏
U Ai
such that d(a) is the U -equivalence class of the constant function with value a. That is
d(a) = (λx.a)U .
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We now introduce the ultraproduct operation on first order structures. For each i ∈ I, let
Mfi be a first order model with universe set Ai. Briefly, the ultraproduct of models
∏
UMfi
is the unique first order model with universe
∏
U Ai such that each basic formula holds in the
ultraproduct if and only if it holds in
∏
UMfi for U -almost all i. Here is the formal definition.
Definition B.5 (Ultraproduct of models). Let U be an ultrafilter over I, and let Mfi be a
familiy of L-structures with universe set Ai. The ultraproduct of models
∏
UMfi is the unique
model Mf such that:2
(i) The universe of Mf is M =∏U Ai.
(ii) For each atomic formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) which has at most one symbol from the vocabulary
L, and each f1, . . . , fk ∈
∏
i∈I Ai,
Mf |= ϕ(f1U , . . . , fkU ) iff {i :Mfi |= ϕ(f1(i), . . . , fk(i))} ∈ U.
Using the properties of ultrafilters one can check that such structure is unique and thus
well-defined. Similarly, the ultrapower of models of the modelMf modulo U is defined as the
ultraproduct
∏
UMf =
∏
UMfi where Mfi =Mf for each i ∈ I.
Finally we present the theorem of  Los´ which makes ultraproducts useful in model theory.
It shows that each formula holds in the ultraproduct if and only if it holds in
∏
UMfi for
U -almost all i. Observe that in this case there is no restriction to basic formulas as before in
Definition B.5.
Theorem B.6 (Fundamental theorem of Ultraproducts,  Los´). Let U be an ultrafilter over I,
and let Mfi be a family of L-structures for each i ∈ I. For each formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk), and
each f1, . . . , fk ∈
∏
i∈I Ai, we have∏
U
Mfi |= ϕ(f1U , . . . , fkU ) iff {i :Mfi |= ϕ(f1(i), . . . , fk(i))} ∈ U.
Corollary B.1. For each set of first-order sentences Γ, and family of modelsMfi . IfMfi |= Γ
for all i ∈ I then ∏UMfi |= Γ.
Corollary B.2 ([BdRV01, Corollary A.21]). Let
∏
UMf be an ultrapower ofMf , the diago-
nal mapping d(a) = (λx.a)U is an elementary embedding. That is, for any first order formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) and a1, . . . , ak ∈Mf
Mf |= ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) if and only if
∏
U
Mf |= ϕ(d(a1), . . . , d(ak)).
Using this results we can state an important theorem, the existence of elementary equiv-
alent ω-saturated ultrapowers.
Theorem B.7. Let F be countable andMf be an F model then there exists an ω-saturated
ultrapower
∏
UMf such that Mf ≡F
∏
UMf .
Proof. Follows from a direct combination of [Kei08, Theorem 5.6] and Corollary B.2.
2 The definition found in [Kei08] has a mistake in point (ii). The subscript of A is missing in the set definition
after the ‘iff’, it should be Ai.
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